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47 
FRIEND OF THE COURT: AN ARRAY OF 
ARGUMENTS TO URGE RECONSIDERATION OF 
THE MOODY BEACH CASES AND EXPAND 
PUBLIC USE RIGHTS IN MAINE’S INTERTIDAL 
ZONE 
Orlando E. Delogu* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the late-1980s, two cases decided by the Maine Supreme Judicial 
Court (Law Court) delineated littoral upland owner property rights vis-à-
vis public use rights in the intertidal zone.  The cases involved intertidal 
land in Wells, Maine, known as “Moody Beach” and were titled Bell v. 
Town of Wells.1  Hereinafter, they will be referred to as Bell I and Bell II, 
respectively.  Upland owner rights, to the surprise of even many upland 
owners, were significantly expanded; public use rights, to the 
disappointment of many, were correspondingly narrowed.  The two cases 
were controversial at the time.  The Marine Law Institute of the 
University of Maine School of Law submitted an extensive amicus brief 
on behalf of the public in the Bell II case; the Bell II opinion itself was a 
4-3 decision of the Law Court which contained a stinging dissenting 
opinion by later Chief Justice Daniel Wathen.2  In the wake of the two 
decisions, the Maine Law Review published a critical symposium issue.3  
The Bell cases have produced further cases parsing out upland owner 
and public use rights in the intertidal zone, and they continue to provoke 
                                            
 * Emeritus Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law; B.S. 
(Economics), 1960,  University of Utah; M.S. (Economics), 1963, J.D., 1966, University 
of Wisconsin. 
 1. Bell v. Town of Wells (Bell I), 510 A.2d 509 (Me. 1986); Bell v. Town of Wells 
(Bell II), 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989).  
 2. Bell II, 557 A.2d at 180. 
 3. Symposium, Public Access and the New England Shoreline, 42 ME. L. REV. 1 
(1990).  
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judicial and scholarly comment.4  Most recently, two lower court cases, 
both raising upland owner challenges to asserted public uses of intertidal 
lands, Flaherty v. Muther5 and McGarvey v. Whittredge,6 were appealed 
to the Law Court.  The briefing schedules for both cases were set two 
weeks apart, and concluded in August, 2010.  Oral arguments in both 
cases were heard in November, 2010.  
Recognizing the importance of the two cases as possible vehicles for 
reexamination by the Law Court of one, or both, of the Bell holdings, the 
Maine Attorney General’s office, asserting a broadened view of public 
use rights in the intertidal zone, sought and was granted intervenor status 
in the Flaherty case, and subsequently, amicus curiae status in the 
McGarvey case.    
This author, a participant in the Marine Law Institute’s 1989 amicus 
brief, sought and was granted amicus status in both cases.  Both of the 
author’s amicus briefs urged the Law Court to reexamine the Bell 
holdings, and then argued for an expanded view of public use rights in 
the intertidal zone.7   
The two briefs were similar in many respects because the asserted 
Bell I and Bell II errors, i.e. the issues and arguments presented in each 
amicus brief, were similar.  To avoid repetition, the second amicus brief, 
Flaherty, presented only new, alternative arguments in support of an 
issue already argued in the first amicus brief for McGarvey.  Arguments 
in the McGarvey brief were incorporated by reference in the second 
                                            
 4. See Eaton v. Town of Wells, 760 A.2d 232 (Me. 2000) (particularly Justice 
Saufley’s concurring opinion); Orlando E. Delogu, Eaton v. Town of Wells: A Critical 
Comment, 6 OCEAN & COASTAL L. J. 225 (2001).   
 5. Flaherty v. Muther, No. RE-08-098, 2009 WL 5667080 (Me. Super. Ct. Dec. 1, 
2009). 
 6. McGarvey v. Whittredge, WASHSC-CV-08-42 (Me. Super. Ct., Wash. Cty., Jan. 
21, 2010). 
 7. Brief for Orlando Delogu as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs/Third Party 
Defendants/Appellees, Flaherty v. Muther, No. CUM-09-631 (Me. 2010); Brief for 
Orlando Delogu as Amici Curaie Supporting Defendants/Appellees, McGarvey v. 
Whittredge, No. WAS-10-83 (Me. 2010).  Amicus briefs in favor of expanded public use 
rights were also submitted in both cases by local counsel Adam Steinman and Neal 
Weinstein on behalf of the Surfrider Foundation, Northern New England Chapter.  And 
finally, the Curtis Thaxter law firm submitted amicus briefs in both cases on behalf of 
littoral upland property owners asserting the correctness of the Bell holdings.  Sidney St. 
F. Thaxter was lead counsel in the Bell cases, and is counsel on behalf of upland owners 
in a pending case raising many of the same issues in controversy here, Almeder v. Town 
of Kennebunkport (the Goose Rocks Beach Case), No. RE-09-111 (Me. Super. Ct. York 
County, filed Oct. 23, 2009).   
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amicus brief.8  Each brief also contained those arguments unique to that 
case.  For whatever value it may have to scholars, those in Maine, or 
other states, called upon to defend public rights in intertidal lands, all of 
the issues, arguments, and footnotes contained in the author’s two amicus 
briefs are combined in this single article. 
II.  THE FACTS IN THE TWO CASES 
A.  McGarvey v. Whittredge, Amicus Brief #1 
This relatively straightforward case came to trial on the basis of an 
agreed-upon statement of facts said to be “undisputed” by the trial court.9  
In this statement both parties implicitly acknowledge that the public has 
a right to be upon the beach—that a “public easement” exists allowing 
“fishing, fowling, and navigation.”10  The trial court, relying on Bell I, 
accepted this proposition.11  Plaintiffs/appellants asserted that 
defendants’ passage across what they referred to as “appellants’ beach” 
to gain access to the ocean and then to deeper water to engage in “scuba 
diving,” and also to use the beach for post-dive “socializing,” are not 
permitted “easement” uses.12  Defendants/appellees, relying on reasoning 
in Bell II, asserted that the term “navigation” is broad enough to 
encompass “scuba diving”; they do not make a similar, or any argument 
that “socializing” on the beach is a permitted “easement” use.13  The trial 
court, drawing largely from Bell II reasoning, ultimately agreed with 
defendants’/appellees’ argument that “navigation” includes “scuba 
diving,” and thus is a permitted public use of the beach.14  The court 
characterized the “socializing” as a trespass, not a permitted use, and 
assessed nominal damages.15  Plaintiffs/appellants have appealed part 
one of the trial court’s conclusion and order in this case to the Law 
Court.16   
                                            
 8. This approach was taken because amicus briefs must conform to page, margin, 
and font size limitations.  Given the number of issues raised, all of the arguments in 
support of a particular issue could not fit into a single brief—so they were divided 
between the two amicus briefs, with the noted incorporations by reference. 
 9. McGarvey, WASHSC-CV-08-42 at 2. 
 10. Id. at 4. 
 11. Id. at 4-5. 
 12. Id. at 3-4. 
 13. Id. at 1-2. 
 14. Id. at 8. 
 15. McGarvey, WASHSC-CV-08-42 at 7-8. 
 16. See id.   
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B.  Flaherty v. Muther, Amicus Brief #2 
The issues in this case17 are anything but straightforward; they have 
spawned an earlier case decided by the Law Court.18  The present case 
has multiple parties, interest groups not joined in the proceeding, and an 
angry, more than four-year long history.  At the trial court level, counsel 
for Muther, a J-lot owner, laid out a detailed twenty-one page statement 
of facts that recounted a long series of confrontations and settlement 
efforts with respect to the use and scope of an easement providing public 
access to a beach area.  These disputations are between Muther, on one 
hand, and members of two separate groups—other J-lot owners and a 
much larger group, the Broad Cove Shore Association.  Issues between 
Muther and the Association were seemingly resolved in the earlier Law 
Court case.19  Because the rights and duties of the two groups 
antagonistic to Muther are not concentric, the current case between 
Muther and the other J-lot owners has had the effect at the trial court 
level of undoing some of the resolutions hammered out and sustained by 
the Law Court in the earlier litigation.  
Several issues in this case—whether the trial court’s disposition of 
matters beyond the use and control of the access easement; whether 
Muther’s interests could be fully reconciled with the interests of the two 
groups they are contending with; whether the State was appropriately 
granted intervenor status in this case; and, whether it fully discharged its 
responsibilities as an intervenor, do not directly involve the scope of 
public use rights in the intertidal zone, and accordingly were not issues 
addressed in Amicus Brief #2.   
Amicus Brief #2 did address what it regarded as the central strategy 
of Muther.  It is an exclusionary strategy aimed first at limiting the 
number of people from within the two groups, noted above, who have 
access to intertidal land abutting Muther’s property—the smaller the 
number, the better.  And secondly, relying on the Bell cases, Muther 
would limit those with access to the intertidal zone to a narrowly defined 
range of “fishing, fowling, and navigation” uses only.  In sum, Muther, a 
littoral upland owner, sought to strengthen and enlarge his property right 
                                            
 17. Flaherty v. Muther, No. RE-08-098, 2009 WL 5667080 (Me. Super. Ct. Dec. 1, 
2009). 
 18. See Muther v. Broad Cove Shore Ass’n, 968 A.2d 539 (Me. 2009). 
 19. See id. 
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by limiting the number of people with access to the intertidal zone, and 
the activities that may be engaged in by those with access.20  
III.  STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
As presented in the amicus briefs, the first issue is a threshold 
question: 
 
I. Whether the Law Court should use one, or both, of the cases 
presently before it as a vehicle to reexamine its holdings in Bell I and/or 
Bell II.   
 
If the Law Court reexamines Bell I, we reach Issues II through V:  
 
II. Whether the Bell I court erred in its determination that the 
Colonial Ordinance vested all upland owners (in Massachusetts and by 
extension Maine) with fee simple title to land in the intertidal zone—
leaving the public with an easement interest limited to “fishing, fowling, 
and navigation.” 
 
III. Whether the Bell I court erred in its interpretation of Shively v. 
Bowlby,21 by ignoring the equal-footing doctrine, and the effect of the 
doctrine in determining title to intertidal lands in Maine. 
 
IV. Whether the Bell I court erred in concluding that Article X, § 3 
of the Maine Constitution, and section 6 of the Act of Separation 
between Maine and Massachusetts, incorporated the Colonial Ordinance 
(as interpreted in Bell I) into the common law of Maine. 
 
                                            
 20. In the statement of facts in Amicus Brief #2, amici noted that prior to the Bell 
cases there was no Maine case (from 1820 to the mid-1980s) that barred any public use of 
the intertidal zone (regulated, yes—barred, none).  Since the Bell cases, there have been 
any number of cases pitting upland owners (who want the highest degree of exclusivity 
they can achieve) against sub-groups of the public who have sought to use the intertidal 
zone in one way or another.  Besides this case, see Eaton v. Town of Wells, 760 A.2d 
232, 248 (Me. 2000); McGarvey v. Whittredge, WASHSC-CV-08-42 (Me. 2010) 
(currently pending before the Law Court); and Almeder v. Town of Kennebunkport (the 
Goose Rocks Case), No. RE-09-111 (a pending case involving Goose Rocks Beach in 
which upland owners would limit public use of intertidal land areas).  There is no end in 
sight to these cases.  
 21. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894). 
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V. Whether the Bell I court erred in failing to treat the legislatively 
adopted Submerged and Intertidal Lands Act (Submerged Lands Act)22 
as an implicit assertion of title to intertidal land in Maine. 
 
If the Law Court reexamines Bell II, we reach Issues VI through 
VIII:  
 
VI. Whether the Bell II court erred in its uncritical acceptance of the 
holdings in Bell I, given the intervening U.S. Supreme Court holding in 
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi.23     
 
VII. Whether the Bell II court erred in narrowly interpreting the 
public uses permitted in the intertidal zone pursuant to the “public 
easement” recognized in the Bell cases.  
 
VIII. Whether the Bell II court erred in concluding that The Public 
Trust in Intertidal Land Act (Intertidal Land Act),24 constituted a taking 
of the upland owners’ private property, including whether the recent U.S. 
Supreme Court case, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida 
Department of Environmental Protection,25 should alter the Bell II 
court’s takings analysis.   
 
If the Law Court, in deciding the cases before it, declines to 
reexamine either Bell I or Bell II, we reach Issue IX: 
 
IX. Whether the Maine Superior Court in McGarvey correctly held 
that the term “navigation” allows the public to use intertidal land to gain 
access to deeper water for the purpose of engaging in recreational or 
commercial scuba diving.26 
                                            
 22. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 1861-1867 (2005) (formerly enacted as ME. REV. STAT. 
tit. 12 § 559 (1997)). 
 23. 484 U.S. 469 (1988). 
 24. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 12 §§ 571-573 (2005) (permitting the public to use intertidal 
lands for recreational purposes). 
 25. 560 U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2592 (2010). 
 26. With respect to the preparation of amicus briefs, Maine Rules of Appellate 
Procedure require that a separate Table of Authorities be prepared, and that after the 
Statement of Issues, a Summary of Arguments (in support of each issue) be presented.  
These are omitted in this article. All of the authorities relied upon are referenced either in 
the text or footnotes of this article.  
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IV.  ARGUMENT: ISSUE I 
As presented in the amicus briefs, the first issue is a threshold 
question: 
 
Whether the Law Court should use the cases presently before it as a 
vehicle to reexamine its holdings in Bell I and/or Bell II.   
 
Though it must be recognized that stare decisis—adherence to 
precedent—is the general rule, it cannot be an immutable rule, or the 
mistakes of the past will be with us forever.27  In Myrick v. James, the 
Law Court noted that “[p]roper respect for precedent as a source of 
stability does not require that each decided case must be held inviolate 
for all time.”28  More usefully, Myrick laid out a multi-factor test for 
determining when it is appropriate to reconsider a Law Court holding.29 
Another relatively recent Law Court case that addressed issues of 
stare decisis is Adams v. Buffalo Forge Co.30  In Adams, the Law Court 
recognized that “[t]he underlying rationale of the doctrine of stare decisis 
is the obvious need to promote consistency and uniformity of decisions.  
The doctrine has been said to serve as a brake upon legal change to be 
applied in the interests of continuity.”31  The Law Court went on: 
While we recognize the unquestioned need for the uniformity 
and certainty the doctrine provides, we have also previously 
recognized the dangers of blind application of the doctrine 
merely to enshrine forever earlier decisions of this Court.  When 
principles fail to produce just results, this Court has found a 
departure from precedent necessary to fulfill its role of reasoned 
decision making . . . . The doctrine, however, is a principle of 
policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest 
decision, however recent and questionable, when such 
adherence involves collision with a prior doctrine more 
embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by 
                                            
 27. See Myrick v. James, 444 A.2d 987 (Me. 1982). 
 28. Id. at 998.  The Myrick court’s discourse on stare decisis is worth reading in full; it 
is replete with case law and scholarly support from Maine and other jurisdictions for 
invoking, and/or setting aside, principles of stare decisis.  
 29. Id. at 1000. 
 30. 443 A.2d 932 (Me. 1982). 
 31. Id. at 935 (citations and quotation marks omitted).  
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experience.  Whether the doctrine should be applied or avoided 
is a decision which rests in the discretion of the court.32   
Even more recently the Law Court decided Eaton v. Town of Wells.33  
The dispute in Eaton was complex; it involved title issues and the scope 
of public use rights on some 2,200 linear feet of intertidal land.  The Bell 
cases, particularly Bell II, were central to plaintiff’s arguments in Eaton, 
and to the trial court’s and the Law Court’s disposition of the case.34   A 
broadened range of public use rights (beyond the narrow “fishing, 
fowling, and navigation” holding of Bell II) was sustained.35   
But, for our purposes, Justice Saufley’s concurring opinion in the 
case is more important.  In a word, she would have revisited, and 
overruled, Bell II, but not before carefully examining the doctrine of 
stare decisis as well as the two Maine cases, Myrick and Adams, noted 
above.36  The concurring opinion pointed out in footnote nine, that all 
five of Myrick’s tests for determining when it is appropriate to reconsider 
a Law Court holding were met.37  But this reasoning, unfortunately, was 
not acquiesced to by the majority of the Eaton court.  Justice Saufley’s 
opinion does suggest, however, that the errors of the Bell cases will not 
go away—events have proved her correct.  Parenthetically, it should be 
noted that all five factors of Myrick’s test for putting aside stare decisis, 
for reexamining the Bell holdings, are also met in the two cases now 
before the Law Court. 
Beyond the reasoning in Myrick, Adams, and Eaton, perhaps the 
most compelling argument for reexamination of the Bell cases is the trial 
                                            
 32. Id. (emphasis added).  Justice Roberts’ opinion in Adams is worth a full reading.  
It examines reliance factors, whether there was a long line of authority supporting the 
case law sought to be reexamined, and whether the legislature has weighed in on the 
issue.  In Adams, these factors warranted both re-examination and reversal of prior case 
law.  Applying these factors to the cases now before the Law Court, we find that the 
narrow reading of public rights in the intertidal zone in both Bell I and Bell II is not 
supported by a long line of prior Maine case law.  On the contrary, Maine case law has 
continuously expanded the “navigation” prong of public use rights.  The Bell holdings, in 
addition to being in conflict with concepts underlying the jus publicum, are also in 
conflict with legislative enactments; they are not well reasoned, not a fair balancing of 
public and private rights in the foreshore, and have been criticized by courts and scholars 
alike.  And other than quelling the exclusionist tendencies of upland owners, no 
significant reliance factors will be upset by a reexamination and modification of the Bell 
holdings—which were decided relatively recently.    
 33. 760 A.2d 232, 232 (Me. 2000); see also Delogu, supra note 4.  
 34. Eaton, 760 A.2d at 244, 247-48. 
 35. Id. at 248.  
 36. Id. at 248-50 (Saufley, J. concurring). 
 37. Id. at 249-50. 
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court opinion in Flaherty.  It is a rare (and heartening) example of 
thoroughness, bluntness, and eloquence, laying out the illogic and 
inconsistencies of the Bell holdings.  It underscores the widely perceived 
view that the Bell cases, rather than simply confirming widely held views 
of public and private rights in the foreshore, represented a fundamental 
shift in the balancing of public and private rights in this unique intertidal 
land area.  Upland owners were given a windfall they could hardly have 
anticipated.  Public use rights in the intertidal zone, and activities 
engaged in for generations, were to be narrowly construed.  What Judge 
Crowley’s opinion suggested was that decisions of this magnitude, given 
their relatively recent date, and the controversy surrounding them, ought 
at least to be reexamined by the Law Court, and if found wanting, as was 
the case in Adams, modified or overturned.     
Furthermore, a reexamination of the Bell cases is necessary because 
of their impact on two significant enactments of the Maine State 
Legislature.  Bell II declared the Intertidal Land Act38 unconstitutional (a 
“taking” of an upland owner’s property).39  And, barely five years after 
an Opinion of the Justices40 declared the Submerged Lands Act41 to be a 
useful, and a permissible, piece of legislation, Bell I, suggested that the 
Act wasn’t even necessary—upland owners had fee simple title to 
intertidal land all along.  Bell I’s terse statement that the 1981 Opinion of 
the Justices was “not binding”42 hardly explains the inconsistency 
between its own reasoning and that of the Opinion of the Justices.  Given 
these realities, deference to a coordinate, co-equal branch of Maine State 
Government would suggest that reexamination of the Bell cases is 
appropriate.  If this produces a reversal or modification of one, or both, 
of the Bell cases, it follows that these two enactments would take on a 
renewed and continuing significance. 
For all of the reasons outlined above, a reexamination of one or both 
of the Bell cases seems both appropriate and necessary.  Either the Bell 
cases will be adhered to, or reasonable new balances will be struck 
between public and private interests/rights in the intertidal zone.  The 
Law Court should use the cases presently before it as a vehicle to 
accomplish these ends. 
                                            
 38. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 571-573 (2005). 
 39. Bell II, 557 A.2d 168, 180 (Me. 1989).  
 40. Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597 (Me. 1981). 
 41. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 12, § 559 (1995) (current version at ME. REV. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 
1861-1867 (2009)). 
 42. Bell I, 510 A.2d 509, 516 n.14 (Me. 1986). 
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That said, it is within the prerogative of the Law Court to reexamine 
only one, both, or neither, of the Bell cases.  If the Law Court reexamines 
Bell I and concludes that it is wrongly decided, then Bell II must almost 
certainly be rejected also—the fundamental premises underlying it will 
have been rejected.   If the Law Court sustains, or declines to reexamine 
Bell I, then Amicus Brief #1 urged as a fall-back position that Bell II be 
reexamined with an eye to softening its harsh pronouncements with 
respect to the public trust doctrine, and the scope of the so-called “public 
easement” in the intertidal zone.  Bell II’s crabbed, too literal reading of 
the “public easement” needlessly, and erroneously, cuts off the 
fundamental strength of the common law, i.e., its ability to evolve over 
time to encompass new and/or changed conditions within a framework of 
law.  Bear in mind, new and/or changed conditions are often not 
foreseen, or anticipated, when the letter of a law is crafted, but if the 
new/changed condition is within the spirit of the law, the common law 
adjusts to assimilate the new reality—that’s what gives both beauty and 
vitality to the common law.  Bell II, unfortunately, leaves little room for 
such adjustments.  
A reexamination of Bell II seems all the more appropriate when it is 
remembered that the Colonial Ordinance, said to grant upland owners 
title to intertidal lands and to reserve a “public easement” (a thin remnant 
of the jus publicum that historically attached to intertidal land), was not 
the product of any bargain; there was no sale, no consideration, no 
language of conveyance.43  It was a gift—an inducement to “wharf 
out,”44 and as such should be liberally construed in favor of the grantor.  
The latter point was recognized by Massachusetts courts.45  In Bell II 
there is no liberal construction in favor of the grantor, in favor of 
reserved public rights in the intertidal zone.  For this reason, if no other, 
a reexamination of Bell II is warranted.  
Finally, given the possibility that neither of the Bell cases will be 
reexamined in the context of deciding the cases presently before the 
court, Amicus Brief #1 simply urged that the Maine Superior Court’s 
holding in McGarvey be affirmed. 
                                            
 43. THE BOOK OF THE GENERAL LAWS AND LIBERTYES CONCERNNG THE INHABITANTS 
OF MASSACHUSETTS 35 (1648) reprinted in SCHOLARLY RESOURCES, 1 THE LAWS AND 
LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS 1641-1691 7, 41 (1976). 
 44. See Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. 435 (1810). 
 45. See Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53, 94 (1851) (holding that when 
government grants a property in the soil of the seashore to enable riparians to erect 
wharves, and by the same act reserves public rights, “it seems just and reasonable to 
construe such reservation much more liberally in favor of the right reserved . . .”). 
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V.  ARGUMENT: ISSUE II 
If the Law Court reexamines Bell I, we reach Issue II:  
 
Whether the Bell I court erred in its determination that the Colonial 
Ordinance vested all upland owners (in Massachusetts and by extension 
Maine) with fee simple title to land in the intertidal zone—leaving the 
public with an easement interest limited to “fishing, fowling, and 
navigation.”   
 
Asserting that, at most, a “qualified title” had been conveyed by the 
Colonial Ordinance—that the grant is more correctly seen as a 
“license”—the amicus briefs argued that the Bell I court erred in its 
determination that the Colonial Ordinance vested all upland owners with 
fee simple title and left the public only with an easement interest limited 
to “fishing, fowling, and navigation.”   
Before there was a State of Maine, a State of Massachusetts, a 
United States, a Massachusetts Bay Colony, a Colonial Ordinance—
before there was parliamentary government in England, a Magna Carta—
there was continental civil law that drew upon earlier Roman law, which 
in turn drew upon the Institutes of Justinian; the latter date back to the 
fifth century and drew upon so-called “natural law.”   From these earliest 
roots it was held that some things were incapable of private ownership.  
Justinian codes said: 
Things common to mankind by the law of nature, are the air, 
running water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea; 
no man therefore is prohibited from approaching any part of the 
seashore whilst he abstains from damaging farms, monuments, 
edifices, etc., which are not in common as the sea is.46  
The U. S. Supreme Court has expressed similar views: 
By the common law, both the title and the dominion of the sea, 
and of rivers and arms of the sea, where the tide ebbs and flows, 
and of all the lands below high water mark, within the 
jurisdiction of the Crown of England, are in the King.  Such 
waters, and the lands which they cover, either at all times, or at 
least when the tide is in, are incapable of ordinary and private 
                                            
 46. Mitchell M. Tannenbaum, The Public Trust Doctrine in Maine’s Submerged 
Lands: Public Rights, State Obligation, and the Role of the Courts, 37 ME. L. REV. 105, 
108 (1985) (quoting the Institutes of Justinian 2.1.1); see also id. at 107-110 (and 
accompanying footnotes).  
58 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:1 
 
occupation,  cultivation and improvement; and their natural and 
primary uses are public in nature, for highways of navigation and 
commerce, domestic and foreign, and for the purpose of fishing 
by all the King’s subjects.   Therefore the title . . . in such lands   
. . . belongs to the King as the sovereign; and the dominion 
thereof, jus publicum, is vested in him as the representative of 
the nation and for the public benefit.47  
At the same time, Shively recognized that the erection of wharves 
benefited navigation and had induced some states to grant “rights and 
privileges in the shore below high water . . . [b]ut the nature and degree 
of such rights and privileges differed in the different Colonies . . . .”48  
Similar views were expressed in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. 
Illinois.49  The Court held that a grant of submerged land encompassing 
essentially the entire harbor of Chicago (to a private riparian/upland 
owner, the Illinois Central railroad) was either void or voidable—the 
Court did not have to choose between the two.50  The Legislature had 
repealed the grant.51  The Court affirmed the repeal, implicitly opting for 
the “voidable” approach.52  The Court reasoned that “[i]t is the settled 
law of this country that the ownership of and dominion and sovereignty 
over lands covered by tide waters, within the limits of the several States, 
belong to the respective States within which they are found . . . .”53  At 
another point, the Court noted: 
[We have already shown] that the State holds the title to the 
lands under the navigable water of Lake Michigan, within its 
limits, in the same manner that [by the common law] the State 
holds title to soils under tide water . . . . It is a title held in trust 
for the people of the State . . . . The interest of the people in the 
navigation of the waters and in commerce over them may be 
improved in many instances by the erection of wharves, docks 
and piers therein, for which purpose the State may grant parcels 
of the submerged lands . . . . But that [the granting of discreet 
parcels] is a very different doctrine from the one which would 
sanction the abdication of the general control of the State over 
lands under the navigable waters of an entire harbor or bay, or 
                                            
 47. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11 (1894). 
 48. Id. at 18.  
 49. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Ill. (Illinois Central), 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
 50. Id. at 460. 
 51. Id. at 449. 
 52. Id. at 464. 
 53. Id. at 435.    
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of a sea or lake.  Such abdication is not consistent with the 
exercise of that trust which requires the government of the State 
to preserve such waters for the use of the public.54   
In sum, law going back 1,500 years, the common law in England 
before the first colony was established, and the basic law in this country, 
as seen by two different U.S. Supreme Court decisions from the late 
1800s, held that land beneath tidal/navigable waters is part of a jus 
publicum.  It is land held by government in trust for the public.   
In some states, to induce or facilitate commerce, discreet parcels of 
intertidal land were granted to littoral or riparian upland owners to build 
wharves, docks, etc.   But title to all other intertidal lands and all public 
rights in tidal/navigable waters remain part of the jus publicum, and are 
held in trust by the sovereign.  And finally, the seminal lesson of Illinois 
Central would seem to be that if you can’t give away all of the land 
underlying Chicago harbor, you surely can’t give away all of the 
intertidal land adjacent to an entire state.   
At least one Maine court has recognized this precise point.  In the 
previously noted Opinion of the Justices, finding the Submerged Lands 
Act55 constitutionally permissible, the Law Court noted that “[o]f course, 
legislation representing ‘a gross or egregious disregard of the public 
interest’ such as occurred in the Illinois Central case, supra, would be 
unconstitutional for failure to meet the reasonableness test of Maine’s 
Legislative Powers Clause.”56 
The Bell I court ignored almost all of the long history delineating and 
balancing public and private rights in intertidal lands; it ignored 
Justinian; it ignored the Shively Court’s summary of the common law, 
including government’s trust duties, and the concept of jus publicum; it 
ignored and does not even cite Illinois Central; and it ignored the 
Opinion of the Justices of the Law Court, noted above.  Instead, Bell I 
asserts (contrary to Shively) that the common law of England is blurred 
and uncertain as a justification for beginning its analysis with the 
Colonial Ordinance.57  
                                            
 54. Id. at 452-453 (emphasis added).  The full reasoning of the Court on these issues 
is laid out on pages 450-460 of the Illinois Central opinion. 
 55. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 §§ 1861-1867 (2005) (formerly ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 12 § 559 (1997)). 
 56. See Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597, 610 (Me. 1981).  The constitutional 
permissibility of Maine’s Submerged Lands Act turned on the same reasoning that moved 
the Illinois Central Court—all of the state’s submerged and intertidal lands were not 
being given away—only discreet (filled) parcels, and then only to serve valid public 
purposes, such as commerce and navigation.     
 57. See Bell I, 510 A.2d 509, 511-512 (Me. 1986).   
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Bell I recognizes that the ordinance “may have been annulled by the 
abrogation of the Colonial Charter,” but asserts nonetheless that it 
“continues as a ‘usage’ that now ‘has force as our common law.’”58  Bell 
I’s reasoning ends by concluding that “the owner of the upland holds title 
in fee simple to the adjoining intertidal zone . . .”59—a judicial grant of 
the intertidal zone, if you will—ignoring whether such a grant, resting on 
nothing more than a judicially sponsored “usage,” is even remotely 
possible.60 
But there is more.  If the common law needed to be modified or 
clarified to facilitate trade, navigation or commerce, then we must 
carefully examine the language of the Colonial Ordinance (the 
Ordinance) itself—the means by which these ends were to be achieved. 
And then an examination of relevant case law explicating the Ordinance 
seems in order. The critical section of the Ordinance states: 
[I]t is declared that in all creeks, coves and other places, about 
and upon salt water where the Sea ebs and flows, the Proprietor 
of the land adjoyning shall have proprietie to the low water mark 
where the Sea doth not ebb above a hundred rods, and not more 
wheresoever it ebs farther.61 
Clearly this is not a deed—not a conventional grant of property.  The 
terms of a bargain are not spelled out; there is no language of 
conveyance and no consideration.   There is no language imposing, or 
even hinting of, any reciprocal duty imposed on upland owners (“the 
Proprietor[s] of the land adjoyning”) that would serve as a quid pro quo 
for this grant—a grant  that (under Bell I) is of unprecedented magnitude.  
And importantly, there is no language conveying a “title,” a “fee,” a 
“title in fee simple,” or a title in “fee simple absolute.”  These terms (or 
any variation of them) cannot be found in the Ordinance.   But 
                                            
 58. Id. at 513 (citation omitted). 
 59. Id. at 515. 
 60. The Law Court, albeit only in the noted Opinion of the Justices, took a contrary 
view.  It also stated that “[o]nly the Parliament, [the Legislature] as the public’s 
representative could alienate the jus publicum.”  Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d at 605.    
 61. There are many versions of the Ordinance with slight word, spelling and 
punctuation variations.  To avoid seeming self-serving, the amicus briefs used a version 
cited by a strong proponent of littoral/upland owner property rights. See Sidney St. F. 
Thaxter, Will Bell v. Town of Wells Be Eroded With Time? 57 ME. L. REV. 118, 122-123 
(2005); see also THE BOOK OF THE GENERAL LAWS AND LIBERTYES CONCERNNG THE 
INHABITANTS OF MASSACHUSETTS 35 (1648) reprinted in SCHOLARLY RESOURCES, 1 THE 
LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS 1641-1691 7, 41 (1976).  The cited text is a 
small part of a larger group of personal Liberties Common, which in turn are a small part 
of the General Lawes and Libertyes of the Massachusetts Bay Colony.  
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littoral/upland owners (and the Bell I court) would bootstrap the only 
phrase used in the Ordinance, “shall have proprietie,” to pass a fee 
simple title to all intertidal land in the entire Massachusetts Bay Colony, 
and by extension to all intertidal land in what is now two states—
Massachusetts and Maine,62 subject only to a reserved public easement of 
“fishing, fowling, and navigation” recognized in other (collateral) 
sections of the Ordinance.63 
Can these defects in the language of the Ordinance be ignored?  The 
amicus briefs and this article argue that they cannot.  Can the result 
contended for by littoral/upland owners and the Bell I court be squared 
with Illinois Central?  It cannot. The Illinois Central Court approvingly 
cites earlier holdings that state “[t]he sovereign power itself, therefore, 
cannot consistently with the principles of the law of nature and the 
constitution of a well ordered society, make a direct and absolute grant of 
the waters of the State, [and ‘lands under them’] divesting all the citizens 
of their common right.”64 
How then should the Ordinance and the critical phrase, “shall have 
proprietie,” be interpreted?  The only way the broad view of public trust 
duty, jus publicum, Shively, Illinois Central, the Ordinance, and the 
critical phrase can be reconciled is to first see the intent of the Ordinance 
(laid out best in Storer v. Freeman),65 and then see the Ordinance’s 
critical phrase as a bestowal of an enlarged property right (a title in fee 
simple) only on those who actually accept the inducement—those who 
wharf out, fill and/or build in the intertidal zone.  They alone can be said 
to have acquired “title” to that portion of intertidal land so used. Those 
who do not accept the inducement gain nothing, and lose nothing—the 
common law with respect to adjoining intertidal land continues to apply.   
This interpretation of the Ordinance and the critical phrase (“shall 
have proprietie”) explains why many courts referred to the upland 
owners’ rights under the Ordinance as a “qualified property.”66  An early 
                                            
 62. The author was aware that there is Massachusetts case law (predicated on the 
same flawed reasoning) that predates and gives support to the Bell holdings.  See 
Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851). But flawed reasoning, flawed 
conclusions, the abandonment of trust duties, a relinquishment of all intertidal land in two 
states on the basis of a judicially fashioned usage does not become good law merely 
because it is repeated over time.  Sooner or later, ill-considered holdings of the past must 
be confronted and overturned.     
 63. Bell I, 510 A.2d 509, 510 (Me. 1986). 
 64. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. 387, 456 (1982) (citations omitted).    
 65. Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. 435 (1810). 
 66. See Mass. v. Inhabitants of Charlestown, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 180, 184 (1822); 
Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Mass., 393 N.E.2d 356, 360 (1979).   
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Maine case, Parker v. Cutler Milldam Co., uses the phrase “a qualified 
right” to describe the right conferred by the Ordinance—a right not to be 
used in a manner that interrupts the rights of the public.67     
Interestingly, the above stated interpretation of the Ordinance (and 
its critical phrase) meshes perfectly with the reasoning in Illinois 
Central.  That Court, speaking of the time period between the Illinois 
legislature’s grant of submerged land to the railroad and the revocation 
of the grant, referred to the grantees’ interest as (at most) “a qualified fee 
in the soil under the navigable waters of the harbor . . . .”68  The Court 
had earlier (more accurately) characterized the property interest of the 
railroad as “a mere license to the company” to prosecute (with the benefit 
of title to a discreet portion of submerged harbor land) such further 
improvement to commerce/the navigable character of the harbor as it 
chose.69   In other words, the statutory inducement held out to the 
railroad was identical to the Colonial Ordinance’s inducement to “wharf 
out” described in Storer.  If the inducement is acted upon by the railroad, 
they acquire fee title to a portion of submerged land; if not, title remains 
in State hands, part of the jus publicum.70  
The Illinois Central Court’s willingness to allow this limited 
alienation of trust property as long as there was no wholesale abdication 
of control over the bed of the entire Chicago harbor is clear.  The Court 
noted that “[t]he control of the State for the purposes of the trust can 
never be lost, except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the 
interests of the public therein, or can be disposed of without any 
substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and waters 
remaining.”71   
Finally on this point, the amicus briefs’ interpretation of the 
Ordinance meshes with, and is implicitly supported by, the previously 
                                            
 67. Parker v. Cutler Milldam Co., 20 Me. 353, 357 (1841). 
 68. See Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 461.  
 69. Id. at 460. 
 70. In the same vein, Shively, in the context of applying the equal-footing doctrine 
to resolve a title dispute to intertidal land, noted that Oregon, and a number of other states 
(four) had adopted legislation intended to facilitate commerce by the building of wharves.  
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 55-56 (1894).  Courts in each of these jurisdictions had 
held, as had the Oregon court: “this act is not a grant.  It simply authorizes upland owners 
on navigable rivers . . . to construct wharves in front of their land.  It does not vest any 
right until exercised.  It is a license, revocable at the pleasure of the legislature until acted 
upon or availed of.”  Id. at 55 (state court citations omitted).  The point being made is that 
(in settings where the intent of state legislation is to encourage the building of wharves on 
intertidal land) the amicus briefs’ interpretation of the critical language of the Ordinance 
(“shall have proprietie”) is not just plausible, but widely accepted.  
 71. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453.  
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noted 1981 Opinion of the Justices, sustaining the Submerged Lands 
Act.72  The Bell I court dismissed this Opinion of the Justices with the 
brusque observation that, “an advisory opinion . . . is not binding upon 
this court.”73  True enough, but it certainly offers us (at a point in time) 
the best judgment of the state’s highest court. The Opinion of the Justices 
noted at the outset that, “intertidal and submerged lands are impressed 
with a public trust . . . .”74  It recognized that only a legislature could 
alienate trust property.75  Further, in a lengthy reference to Illinois 
Central, the Opinion of the Justices noted that “[t]he prodigality of the 
[original Illinois legislative grant] was obvious . . . ,” and that Maine’s 
Submerged Lands Act avoided any such excess.76   As in Illinois Central, 
the Opinion of the Justices sustained a legislative act that enabled a 
discreet number of upland owners to obtain fee title to filled intertidal 
lands, but only when valid public purposes were met.77   
Summarizing this point, the logic of the Law Court’s Opinion of the 
Justices and the Supreme Court’s Illinois Central seems clear—taken 
together they wholly contradict/refute the holding in Bell I.  If only a 
legislature can alienate trust property, then a judicially sponsored 
“usage” cannot.  If a statute may alienate only discreet parcels of 
submerged and/or intertidal land, then the remaining portion of those 
submerged and/or intertidal lands (the part that has not been alienated) 
remains in state hands, and is today part of Maine’s (or Illinois’s) jus 
publicum.78   
Beyond the arguments made to this point for rejecting 
Massachusetts’ (and by extension the Bell I court’s) view that the 
Ordinance granted title/ownership of all intertidal lands to littoral upland 
owners, the amicus briefs urged the Law Court to consider the 
scholarship and reasoning offered by Mark Cheung.79   To say that Mr. 
Cheung takes issue with the grant theory of intertidal land alienation is 
                                            
 72. See Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597 (Me. 1981). 
 73. Bell I, 510 A.2d 509, 516 n.14 (citations omitted).  
 74. Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d at 607. 
 75. Id. at 605. 
 76. Id. at 609. 
 77. Id. at 607-608. 
 78. Its status is similar to the “public lots” in Maine or public domain lands in the 
West; it is held (owned if you will) in trust by government on behalf of the people.     
 79. Mr. Cheung, a legal historian, offers a careful exposition of the people, the 
customs, the competing interests extant in the colonial period (early 1600s), and the 
language and actual purpose of the Colonial Ordinance.  Mark Cheung, Rethinking the 
History of the Seventeenth-Century Colonial Ordinance: A Reinterpretation of an Ancient 
Statute, 42 ME. L. REV. 115 (1990).  
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an understatement.  He argues that Massachusetts got it wrong, and thus 
the Bell I court (by simply acceding to Massachusetts law) got it wrong.  
Cheung states:  
Having reviewed the socio-economic history of the 
Massachusetts colony, the traditional interpretation of the 
Ordinance in Massachusetts and Maine becomes vulnerable.  
The language of the Ordinance itself, the existing laws, and the 
contemporary socio-political conditions favor another 
construction.  Under this view, the Ordinance granted to the 
upland owners only a riparian right of priority [to] use [the 
intertidal zone] not a right of property [in the zone].  Two factors 
support this interpretation. First, the General Court that passed 
the Ordinance, though competent to make such a conveyance, 
gave no clear indication of any intent to convey a property right.  
Second, the traditional presumption that the Ordinance was 
designed to promote commercial activities is without firm 
historical foundation.  If such had been the intent of the colonial 
government, other less drastic measures could have been 
implemented to achieve the same goal.80  
Cheung points out that the Ordinance phrase “shall have proprietie” 
at the time had two (or more) meanings.81  In some settings it connoted a 
“property” interest; in other settings, it connoted only “an appropriate 
use” or “a priority” of right.82  He concludes that the latter meaning was 
intended in the Ordinance because the language is a small part of a larger 
body of personal/individual rights and liberties, what were referred to as 
“Liberties Common.”83  It is not in that part of the General Lawes and 
Libertyes dealing with the boundaries of towns and individual 
properties.84 
Furthermore, he points out that none of the customary words of 
conveyance (well-known at the time) are used in this purported grant.85  
He also points out that there was no pressing commercial need (at this 
time), nor does the language suggest an intent to convey all intertidal 
land.86   On the contrary, the whole compilation of the General Lawes 
and Libertyes (almost twelve years in the making) was to strike a balance 
                                            
 80. Id. at 146-147 (citations omitted). 
 81. Id. at 149. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 150. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See id. at 148-49 n.217. 
 86. See id. at 152-54. 
2010] Friend of the Court 65 
 
between public powers and private interests.87  There was a felt need to 
restrain centralized government which seemed threatening to a dispersed 
citizenry.88   Moreover, the government had engaged in some “wharfing 
out” projects to the detriment of upland owner interests.89   Cheung 
argues that the balance sought to be struck was intended to recognize that 
littoral upland owners both needed and were entitled to “a priority,” a 
preferred right to use this intertidal area.90  Their survival, by virtue of 
their location, often depended on fishing, fowling, and/or more limited 
navigational enterprises.91   
Cheung buttresses his balancing thesis by pointing to the sentence in 
the Ordinance (after “shall have proprietie”)—a sentence that, while 
recognizing the priority of use accorded upland owners, protects larger 
public interests.  This balancing sentence reads, “[p]rovided that such 
Proprietor shall not by this libertie have power to stop or hinder the 
passage of boats or other vessels in or through any sea, creeks, or 
coves.”92  In sum, the jus publicum had to be maintained.  
Cheung continues his argument by pointing out that upland owners 
almost certainly already had a common law right to “wharf out”; and, 
more importantly, he points out, “[e]ven if the General Court had 
intended to give the littoral owners a personal incentive to develop it 
[intertidal land] commercially, other more feasible and less drastic means 
were certainly available, short of a wholesale conveyance of the 
foreshore.”93   
Cheung cites any number of examples where franchises were granted 
or tax incentives fashioned (a range of 1640s industrial development 
mechanisms) all of which, “fall far short of annexation of the intertidal 
zone to the upland estate.”94 
Cheung concludes his historical analysis of the Ordinance by noting 
that, after its promulgation in 1647, the few court cases that can be found 
                                            
 87. See id. at 151-52. 
 88. See id. 
 89. See id. at 151-54. 
 90. Id. at 156-57. 
 91. See generally id. at 151-52.  In the 1600s road networks were all but non-existent; 
navigation included the movement of persons and goods between coastal villages in small 
boats, and the lateral passage of persons and livestock along the foreshore (via wagon, on 
horseback, or on foot) as tide stages permitted.  
 92. See THE BOOK OF THE GENERAL LAWS AND LIBERTYES CONCERNNG THE 
INHABITANTS OF MASSACHUSETTS 35 (1648) reprinted in SCHOLARLY RESOURCES, 1 THE 
LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS 1641-1691 7, 41 (1976); see also Cheung, supra 
note 79, at n.236. 
 93. Cheung, supra note 79, at 153. 
 94. Id. at 154.   
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addressing the Ordinance did not treat the upland owner as holding fee 
title to intertidal land—he notes that: 
In a civil case in 1664, a Massachusetts court still referred to the 
high water mark as the natural monument by which to define 
boundaries at the shore.  In 1790, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court found it necessary to point out that the littoral 
proprietors may “use” [they did not own] the flats to the low 
water mark.  If the Ordinance had clearly conveyed the intertidal 
zone to these littoral proprietors, they would certainly have had 
use of the flats without needing court authorization.95 
A review of Massachusetts court cases makes clear that more than 
150 years elapsed (after promulgation of the Ordinance) before 
Massachusetts courts began to characterize the sparse and ambiguous 
language of the Ordinance as a conveyance of fee title to intertidal land.  
More than 200 years elapsed before what is regarded as the definitive 
case confirming this characterization, Commonwealth v. Alger, was 
decided.96  Chief Justice Shaw’s lengthy discourse seeks to quell debate 
as to the meaning and effect of the Ordinance—he asserts that the 
Ordinance conveyed intertidal land in fee to upland owners.97  But at the 
same time he admits the paucity of cases prior to 1800.98  And he also 
recognizes the great value that these intertidal lands represented to 
upland owners in harbors such as Boston.99  It does not strain credulity to 
see Alger as a post hoc interpretation of the Ordinance—an interpretation 
that met the commercial needs of Massachusetts in the 1850s (and 
continues to the present) but one not needed, not intended, and not 
contemplated by the seventeenth century drafters of the General Lawes 
and Liberties of the Massachusetts Bay Colony.  Cheung summarizes his 
argument by noting that “[t]he intent behind the Ordinance remains the 
central dispute in modern litigation over rights in the intertidal zone.  As 
this Article has demonstrated, colonial history does not support the 
traditional view that the Ordinance acted as a conveyance of property.”100  
The gap of more than 200 years between the 1647 Ordinance and 
Alger, the fact that the Alger interpretation is clearly out of sync with 
                                            
 95. Id. at 155; see especially id. at nn.252, 253.  A full reading of pages 146-155 of 
Mr. Cheung’s article, including his extensive footnote citations, seems useful.  See also 
id. at 146-155 for Mr. Cheung’s discussion of the Ordinance’s application.   
 96. See Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53 (1851). 
 97. Id. at 79. 
 98. Id. at 72-73. 
 99. Id. at 73.  
 100. Cheung, supra note 79, at 156.  The author shares Mr. Cheung’s view. 
2010] Friend of the Court 67 
 
English common law and early colonial law, and, as Shively points out, 
does not conform with the law regarding title to intertidal land in any of 
the other original states, strengthens Cheung’s argument.  
Concluding the entire argument on this issue, the critical errors of 
Maine law, with respect to intertidal land, are: first, that neither the 
legislative branch nor the judicial branch has ever undertaken to see 
Maine as a separate entity, entitled to fashion its own law with respect to 
intertidal land; second, there has been no critical examination of the 
actual language of the Ordinance, its real intent in a 1640s colonial 
setting, the law of other nations and other states with respect to intertidal 
land, or the implications of extending Alger-type reasoning to a coastal 
area as vast as Maine’s.  Early Maine legislatures charged with getting a 
new state up and running, and fashioning a first body of laws, were far 
too busy to concern themselves with these issues.101 
And Maine’s courts, from Lapish v. Bangor Bank102 to Bell I, have 
simply declined to examine the Ordinance in the light of Maine’s new 
status—a state, separate and apart from Massachusetts.103  The Lapish 
court, when invited by counsel to examine the Ordinance’s application in 
Maine, responded as follows: 
It has been contended by the counsel in the defence, as before 
observed, that for several reasons the colonial Ordinance of 1641 
does not apply in the present case, either by enactment, 
construction, or adoption.  The history of it is given in Storer v. 
Freeman, by Parsons, C. J., and he observes, “This ordinance 
was annulled with the charter, by the authority of which it was 
made; but from that time to the present, an usage has prevailed, 
                                            
 101. Other than regulatory measures, perhaps the first intertidal land legislative action 
implicating ownership interests, trust duties, policy matters, and the jus publicum were 
the Submerged Lands Act, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 12 § 559 (1997) (currently enacted as ME 
REV. STAT. tit 12, §§ 1861-1867 (2005)), and the Intertidal Land Act, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 
12 §§ 571-573 (2005).  They were enacted in 1975 and 1985, respectively, and while 
neither examined the broad issues of Maine’s intertidal land law, both suggested that the 
Legislature saw itself (in some sense) as owner/trustee of intertidal land, a body charged 
with protecting the jus publicum.  The Opinion of the Justice was a response to questions 
posed with respect to the Submerged Lands Act.  That response could not address the 
broadest questions in re Maine’s intertidal land law, but it implicitly saw the state as 
owner/trustee/guardian of intertidal land, the jus publicum, and it recognized the 
implications of cases such as Shively and Illinois Central in shaping a distinct body of 
Maine intertidal land law. 
 102. 8 Me. 85 (1831).  
 103. See Orlando Delogu, Intellectual Indifference—Intellectual Dishonesty: the 
Colonial Ordinance, the Equal Footing Doctrine, and the Maine Law Court, 42 ME. L. 
REV. 43, 58 (1990).   
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which has now the force of our common law.”  Ever since that 
decision, as well as long before, the law on this point has been            
considered as perfectly at rest; and we do not feel ourselves at 
liberty to discuss it as an open question.104        
In the same vein, the Bell I court wrapped its arms around early-
1800s Massachusetts case law and, citing Lapish, declined to examine 
whether and, if so, to what extent the Ordinance and Massachusetts law 
ought to dictate Maine’s law with respect to intertidal land.  Bell I 
accepts the Lapish view that “a usage” has prevailed, characterizing 
Maine’s intertidal land law as “a piece of judicial legislation.”105  No 
thought is given to separation of powers, or to whether all intertidal land 
in an entire state can be alienated by such a glib turn of phrase.  Bell I’s 
reasoning finds a hero in Chief Justice Shaw and embraces the Alger case 
without considering any of the several arguments laid out above.   
In sum, the Lapish and Bell I courts have simply acquiesced to the 
receipt of Massachusetts intertidal land law as the law applicable in 
Maine.  There has never been a full, independent assessment by the Law 
Court (or the Legislature) of the Ordinance, Massachusetts case law, the 
equal-footing doctrine, Maine’s extensive coastal geography, changing 
uses of intertidal land, or the reasoning of legal historians such as Mr. 
Cheung (presented above), in an effort to finally fashion a unique body 
of Maine law with respect to intertidal land.    
The holding in Bell I (more firmly than in Lapish) aligns Maine’s 
intertidal land law squarely with Massachusetts law.  The issue before 
the Law Court then, is whether Bell I was correctly decided; whether it 
ignored arguments, lines of reasoning that would have allowed Maine to 
carve out its own law with respect to intertidal land areas. 
The amicus briefs argued that Bell I’s studied indifference to history, 
relevant case law, the intent and language of the Ordinance itself, the 
limits of judicial power, was error.  These errors parroting past flawed 
interpretation of the Ordinance led to a flawed conclusion in Bell I as to 
littoral and upland owners’ property rights in Maine’s intertidal zone.  
The fact that these errors, stemming from flawed reasoning (in whole, or 
in part), have been handed down for some time does not make them any 
less erroneous.  For some time many believed the world was flat, yet that 
did not make it so.  
The fact that these errors find expression in the case law of a 
neighboring state is beyond our control.  To the extent that they find 
                                            
 104. Lapish, 8 Me. at 93 (emphasis added, citation omitted). 
 105. See Bell I, 510 A.2d 509, 514 (Me. 1986). 
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expression in prior Maine case law, and are encapsulated in Bell I, the 
Law Court can, and the amicus briefs argued, should, take corrective 
action.  In short, Bell I should be overturned.106  
VI.  ARGUMENT: ISSUE III 
If the Law Court reexamines Bell I, we reach Issue III:  
 
Whether the Bell I court erred in its interpretation of Shively v. 
Bowlby,107 by ignoring the equal-footing doctrine and the effect of the 
doctrine in determining title to intertidal lands in Maine.   
 
The amicus briefs argued that the Bell I court’s failure to address the 
equal-footing doctrine was indeed reversible error.  Let’s be clear, the 
Bell I court had Shively v. Bowlby in front of it; it cited Shively three 
times.  The court’s first reference accepts Shively’s description of the 
English common law pertaining to the intertidal zone, i.e., that upland 
owner’s rights did not extend below high water, and further, accepts the 
fact that this view “has prevailed in the United States.”108  The latter two 
references underscore Shively’s point that some states had to a greater or 
lesser degree authorized departures from the common law of England.109  
These Bell I references to Shively are not unimportant; they both 
undercut and support aspects of Bell I’s holding and final conclusions.  
But they focus on minor aspects of the Shively case and make no 
reference to the central issues in Shively: the meaning, the scope, and the 
application of the equal-footing doctrine.110   
Because the dispute in Shively involved competing claims by two 
upland owners to the same intertidal land, and at the same time turned on 
this doctrine, the court found it necessary to explain the doctrine.  Justice 
                                            
 106. It is worth noting that Bell I’s views (in Massachusetts and in Maine) have always 
been held with some degree of discomfort and caution—thus the repeated case law 
admonition “to construe [the reserved rights] much more liberally in favor of [the 
grantor],” see Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53, 94 (1981); and the repeated 
characterization of the upland owners intertidal right as a “qualified fee,” “a qualified 
property,” “a mere license” see supra notes 65-70, and accompanying text.  More 
recently the highest court in Massachusetts speaking of upland owner intertidal rights 
noted: “this ownership always had strings attached.” See Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. 
Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356, 360 (Mass. 1979).  
 107. 152 U.S. 1 (1894). 
 108. See Bell I, 510 A.2d at 511.   
 109. Id. at 511, 515. 
 110. See Delogu, supra note 103, at 53-55.   
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Gray noted that the doctrine applied to new states admitted into the 
Union—they were intended to have, “the same rights of sovereignty, 
freedom and independence as the other States . . .”—in other words, they 
were admitted “on an equal footing with the original States in all respects 
whatever.”111  Speaking directly to intertidal land rights, Shively noted 
that “[t]he new States admitted into the Union since the adoption of the 
Constitution have the same rights as the original States in the tide waters, 
and in the lands below the high water mark, within their respective 
jurisdictions.”112  At another point,113 the Shively Court approvingly cited 
Knight v. United States Land Association114 and Pollard v. Hagan.115  
The Knight Court stated: 
It is the settled rule of law in this court that absolute property in, 
and dominion and sovereignty over, the soils under the tide 
waters in the original States were reserved to the several States; 
and that the new States since admitted have the same rights, 
sovereignty, and jurisdiction in that behalf as the original States 
possess within their respective borders.116 
The Pollard Court stated that “[t]he right of Alabama and every 
other new state to exercise all the powers of government, which belong 
to and may be exercised by the original state of the union, must be 
admitted, and remain unquestioned . . . .”117     
With this doctrinal background in its mind’s eye, the Shively Court 
turned to the dispute before it.  It is important to note that Oregon 
became a state in 1859.  Shively’s claim had its roots in a pre-statehood 
(1850) grant by the United States of public domain land that abutted the 
Columbia River.  Shively presumed his grant included land below high 
water.  He subsequently subdivided the land.118  Bowlby legally acquired 
an upland parcel of the subdivided land; he subsequently acquired from 
the State of Oregon adjoining land below high water (pursuant to an 
1872 Act); Shively, however, claimed he had retained title to this 
intertidal parcel of land.119   
                                            
 111. See Shively, 152 U.S. at 26 (citations omitted). 
 112. Id.  
 113. Id. at 30. 
 114. 142 U.S. 161 (1891). 
 115. 44 U.S. 212 (1845). 
 116. See Knight, 142 U.S. at 183. 
 117. Pollard, 44 U.S. at 224.   
 118. Shively, 152 U.S. at 9. 
 119. Id. 
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The trial court and the U.S. Supreme Court were of one mind.  The 
United States could certainly alienate by granting title to public domain 
land in territories it held, leaving Shively’s upland title secure; but 
drawing on cases such as Pollard and Knight, as well as English 
common law with respect to intertidal land, and the equal-footing 
doctrine, they could not alienate land below high water—“they held it 
only in trust for the future States that might be created out of such 
territory.”120  Oregon acquired title to these tidelands in trust for the 
public under the equal-footing doctrine upon becoming a state in 1859.121  
The only question that remained was whether Oregon’s grant of title to a 
discreet parcel of tideland to Bowlby was valid.  Both courts determined 
that it was.122  Bowlby had fully responded to an Oregon statute intended 
to encourage “wharfing out”; he acquired title to the parcel of tideland in 
question by actually filling/building and enhancing the possibilities for 
marine commerce.123   
The relevance of these core issues Shively (the meaning, intent, and 
application of the equal-footing doctrine) to the issues before the Law 
Court in Bell I seems self-evident.  The failure of the Bell I court even to 
mention the doctrine or consider whether the doctrine might free Maine 
(a new state in 1820) of the baggage Massachusetts had created for itself 
with respect to intertidal land titles is an egregious error. 
Beyond the failure of the Bell I court to appreciate the central issue 
in Shively, i.e., its discussion and application of the equal-footing 
doctrine, the Bell I court failed to recognize that the roots of this doctrine 
extend much further back in time than the Shively case itself. The 
doctrine has its beginning in Article IV, of the United States 
Constitution, which with respect to a variety of issues, establishes the 
principal of co-equality among the several states, including new states 
which may be admitted into the Union.124 
The holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in Martin v. Lessee of 
Waddell offered early recognition of this equality as applied to rights in 
intertidal land.125  In this case, claims said to originate from colonial 
grants and enactments reaching back to 1664 and 1674 were in conflict 
with more recent claims springing from 1824 legislation adopted by the 
State of New Jersey (one of the thirteen original colonies and states).  
                                            
 120. See Knight, 142 U.S. at 183.    
 121. Shively, 152 U.S. at 51-52. 
 122. Id. at 55-58. 
 123. Id. at 9. 
 124. U.S. CONST. art. IV. 
 125. Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. 367 (1842). 
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Chief Justice Taney, while expressing doubt that the jus publicum was, 
or could be, alienated by royal grant, took a more direct position. 126   In 
holding for those claiming under New Jersey law, Chief Justice Taney 
stated: 
When the Revolution took place, the people of each state became 
themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute 
right to all their navigable waters and the soils under them for 
their own common use, subject only to the rights since 
surrendered by the Constitution to the general government.  A 
grant made by their authority must therefore manifestly be tried 
and determined by different principles from those which apply to 
grants of the British crown . . . .127 
The above citation makes two important points.  First, that all of the 
original states were equal in their “absolute right to all their navigable 
waters and the soils under them.” And second, that early claims rooted in 
British colonial grants drop away with the founding of a new nation with 
thirteen co-equal states. 
If we take the development of the country one step further, the 
fashioning of new states beyond the original thirteen from territory of the 
new nation, then we come to Pollard v. Hagan.128   In Pollard we were 
dealing with facts similar to the facts in Martin—both cases involved 
title disputes to intertidal land.  In Pollard, one set of claimants relied on 
Alabama law;129 the other set of claimants relied on Georgia law and/or 
early, pre-statehood Spanish grants.130  Suffice it to say that the 
disputants claiming under Alabama law prevailed.131  The Pollard Court 
reasoned that just as a new nation was not bound by the law that 
preceded the revolution, so the new State of Alabama, fashioned out of 
territory formerly a part of Georgia, was not bound by Georgia intertidal 
land law or pre-statehood Spanish grants.132  
But more important for our purposes was the Pollard Court’s 
articulation of the co-equality of rights between new states and original 
states and the repeated references to a doctrine of equal-footing.133  
                                            
 126. See id. at 408-409. 
 127. Id. at 410.  
 128. 44 U.S. 212 (1845).  See supra note 117, and accompanying text. 
 129. Id. at 214. 
 130. Id. at 214-16. 
 131. Id. at 230. 
 132. Id. at 225-30. 
 133. See, e.g., id. at 216, 222, 223.  The Pollard case marks one of the first, if not the 
first, use by the U.S. Supreme Court of the phrase “equal-footing” to emphasize the 
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The manner in which the new states were to be admitted into the 
union, according to the ordinance [Congressional Act] of 1787, 
as expressed therein, is as follows: “And whenever any of the 
said states shall have sixty thousand free inhabitants therein, 
such state shall be admitted by its delegates into the Congress of 
the United States, on an equal footing with the original states in 
all respects whatever.”134 
The Court went on: “[t]he object of all the parties to these contracts of 
cession, was to . . . erect  new states over the territory thus ceded; and . . . 
they [the new states], and the original states, will be upon an equal 
footing, in all respects whatever.”135  And finally: 
By the preceding course of reasoning we have arrived at these 
general conclusions: First, The shores of navigable waters, and 
the soils under them, were not granted by the Constitution to the 
United States, but were reserved to the states respectively. 
Secondly, the new states have the same rights, sovereignty, and 
jurisdiction over this subject as the original states.136   
If one substitutes Maine and Massachusetts for Alabama and 
Georgia, respectively, and if one substitutes the purported Colonial 
Ordinance grant, if indeed that’s what it was, which many years later is 
said to dictate Maine’s intertidal land law, for the Spanish grants in 
Pollard or the British grants in Martin, then the significance of these two 
cases is readily seen. Alabama and New Jersey prevailed; they were not 
saddled with ancient grants and they fashioned their own intertidal land 
law.  Maine too, should not be saddled with ancient Ordinance grants. 
Maine, albeit belatedly,137 should be permitted to fashion its own 
intertidal land law.  
In sum, the Martin case makes clear that after the revolution there 
was a new paradigm—a new nation. This nation was prepared to protect 
                                                                                                  
separateness, but at the same time the absolute equality of each state vis-a-vis every other 
state within the Union.  This verbalization of the concept has been used repeatedly since 
Pollard, see, e.g., Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894), and Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Miss., 484 U.S. 469 (1988), and has been extended to other areas of law, not just the law 
related to navigable waters and intertidal land.  It seems firmly embedded as a doctrine in 
our constitutional law jurisprudence.    
 134. Pollard, 44 U.S. at 222 (emphasis added). 
 135. Id. at 224 (emphasis added). 
 136. Id. at 230.   
 137. It is worth recalling that in Phillips Petroleum, the U.S. Supreme Court was not 
troubled by the fact that Mississippi established its claim to intertidal land, by application 
of the equal-footing doctrine, 171 years after statehood.      
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the jus publicum; it clothed each of the thirteen new states with equal 
authority to control their navigable waters and intertidal lands and in 
each new state (as it came forward over time) a similar right to fashion 
its own intertidal land law was recognized. That is what equal-footing 
between the several states means.  Anything less is not full equality. 
Bell I’s error was not simply that it failed to address Shively’s 
holding and analysis in regards to the equal-footing doctrine, but also 
that it failed to cite or understand the significance of the Martin and 
Pollard cases noted above—cases that early on gave meaning and scope 
to the equal-footing doctrine.  The amicus briefs argued that the Bell I 
court’s failure to address these cases and to accord them the respect they 
were due was error that the Law Court has the power to correct. 
Moreover, the Phillips Petroleum case makes clear that the equal-
footing doctrine has continuing vitality.  Its application is not a matter of 
convenience or judicial discretion; it applies, even if it has lay dormant 
for almost two centuries—long settled expectations based on judicial 
errors of the past, notwithstanding.  Phillips Petroleum further supports 
the view that Bell I should be overturned. 
VII. ARGUMENT: ISSUE IV 
If the Law Court reexamines Bell I, we reach Issue IV:  
 
Whether the Bell I court erred in concluding that article X, section 3 
of the Maine Constitution, and section 6 of the Act of Separation 
between Maine and Massachusetts, incorporated the Colonial Ordinance 
(as interpreted in Bell I) into the common law of Maine.   
 
The amicus briefs argued that the Bell I court had indeed erred in this 
respect.  The Bell I court’s conclusion cannot be reached on the basis of 
the two enactments noted. Let’s begin by examining the two critical 
enactments themselves.  Article X, section 3 of Maine’s Constitution 
reads, in pertinent part: “[a]ll laws now in force in this State, and not 
repugnant to this Constitution, shall remain, and be in force, until altered 
or repealed by the Legislature, or shall expire by their own limitation.”138  
Section 6 of the Massachusetts Act of Separation reads, in pertinent part:  
That all the laws which shall be in force within said District of 
Maine, upon the said fifteenth day of March next, shall remain, 
and be in force, within the said proposed State, until altered or 
                                            
 138. ME. CONST. art. X, § 3. 
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repealed by the government thereof, such parts only excepted as 
may be inconsistent with the situation and condition of said new 
State, or repugnant to the Constitution thereof.139   
Both of these enactments contain language suggesting that not all of 
Massachusetts law was to be brought forward and become a part of 
Maine law.   Some laws were to be “excepted” as “inconsistent with” or 
“repugnant140 to . . . the situation and condition of said new State,” the 
new Maine Constitution, and by extension the U.S. Constitution.141   
These limitations are triggered here.  Massachusetts law with respect 
to intertidal lands at the time of the separation of Maine from 
Massachusetts was described by state court cases, and more recently by 
Bell I as follows: the Ordinance, intending to foster “wharfing out,” 
broke with English common law—littoral upland owners were given fee 
simple title to intertidal lands and the public was accorded an easement 
allowing “fishing, fowling, and navigation.”142   Bell I also recognized 
that the English common law, which did not extend upland owner’s 
rights below high water, was the prevailing view in the United States in 
1820.  The two positions, i.e., Massachusetts intertidal land law and 
English common law, which was the prevailing view with respect to 
intertidal land in all of the other states, are inconsistent, contradictory, 
and incompatible with one another.   
Ergo, the Massachusetts law did not become a part of Maine law by 
virtue of limiting provisions in both of the above enactments.   After the 
Act of Statehood, the Maine Legislature was the only body that had the 
right to decide which of these two positions Maine would adopt. 
Notwithstanding the significance of the issue, one cannot find an 
enactment by the first Maine Legislature (or any subsequent legislative 
body) that resolves the issue of whether the English common law with 
respect to intertidal land or Massachusetts’ minority view was to be the 
law in Maine.143     
                                            
 139. An Act Relating to the Separation of the District of Maine from Massachusetts 
Proper, and forming the same into a separate and independent State, ch. 161, § 6, 1819 
Mass. Laws, in LAWS OF THE STATE OF MAINE 23 (Calvin Spaulding 1822). 
 140. The dictionary defines “repugnant” as inconsistent, contradictory, or 
incompatible.  See, e.g. Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/repugnant (last visited Jan. 3, 2011). 
 141. It should be noted that “not [being] repugnant” to the Maine Constitution, also 
requires that one’s actions “not [be] repugnant” to the Constitution of the United States.  
See ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, §1. 
 142. Bell I, 510 A.2d 509, 515 (Me. 1986). 
 143. A reading of the History of Statutory Law in the State of Maine, indicates that the 
first meeting of the first Legislature of the State of Maine was held in Portland on May 
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The closest one comes is the Maine Legislature’s enactment in 1981 
of the Submerged Lands Act; this legislation was sustained by the Law 
Court in the 1981 Opinion of the Justices.144  Implicitly, the Act adopts 
the English common law.145  The sustaining Opinion of the Justices 
allows limited alienation(s) of trust property when public purposes are 
served.  However, the court was not prepared to sustain the wholesale 
alienation of all of Maine’s intertidal land; it noted, “[o]f course 
legislation representing a gross or egregious disregard of the public 
interest such as occurred in the Illinois Central case would be 
unconstitutional for failure to meet the reasonableness test of Maine’s 
Legislative Powers Clause.”146  It follows then that an alienation of all of 
a state’s intertidal land accomplished by “judicial usage,” what the Bell I 
court refers to as “a piece of judicial legislation,”147 would be similarly 
defective.148  Bell I’s reasoning ignores the Opinion of the Justices and 
the holding in Illinois Central, and, more importantly, the express 
                                                                                                  
31, 1820.  HISTORY OF STATUTORY LAW IN THE STATE OF MAINE, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
vol. 1, 5-23 (1985).  Two days later, June 2, 1820, then Governor William King 
addressing both houses of the Legislature urged that “serious consideration be given to 
the possibility of establishing a statutory code for Maine.”  Id. at 8.  That 
recommendation was accepted—a Board of Jurisprudence was formed.  The History of 
Statutory Law in the State of Maine states: “[t]he Board’s procedure was to lay before it 
the laws of Massachusetts and report the acceptable provisions to the Legislature as fast 
as the drafts were finished, as separate acts.” Id. at 12.  By March 19, 1821, some 500 
Acts were before the Legislature; 179 Acts (some revised versions of Massachusetts law, 
some wholly new Acts) were adopted and signed by the Governor.  Many Acts were laid 
over for disposition at the next legislative session.  Id. at 12, 16-17.  In sum, early Maine 
legislatures were diligent in fashioning a first body of statutory law for Maine—they did 
not adopt Massachusetts statutes en masse. To be sure, Massachusetts statutes were the 
template, but many provisions of Massachusetts law were not adopted, while still others 
were amended or enlarged.  The work went on for years.  The History of Statutory Law in 
the State of Maine does not indicate that any aspect of Massachusetts common law was 
subject to legislative scrutiny, repeal, modification, or adoption.  Nor does the History 
indicate that Massachusetts law delineating rights in the intertidal zone, said to derive 
from “judicial usage,” was ever examined.  Finally, the History indicates that no 
legislation addressing Maine intertidal land law was adopted. 
 144. See Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597, 597 (Me. 1981); see also supra notes 
40, 55-60, 72-78, and accompanying text. 
 145. Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d at 597. 
 146. Id. at 610; see also ME. CONST., art. IV, pt. III, § 1.   
 147. Bell I, 510 A.2d at 514.   
 148. See Delogu, supra note 103, at 57-58 n.73.  
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language of article X, section 3,149 and separation of powers provisions in 
article III of the Maine Constitution.   
Moreover, neither of the two critical enactments (cited at the outset 
of this argument) can preempt application of the equal-footing doctrine.  
Given this reality and the fact that Massachusetts’ position with respect 
to intertidal lands was conceded in the Bell I holding to be a minority 
view, and that English common law is the prevailing view in the United 
States, it follows that Maine as a new state, exercising its equal-footing 
prerogatives, acting through the Legislature, must choose whether to 
fashion a unique body of Maine law, or simply adopt Massachusetts 
intertidal land law.  Massachusetts law cannot simply be foisted on 
Maine.  
Furthermore, the Act of Separation ignores a necessary due regard 
for the separateness of states vis-a-vis one another.  It is certainly true 
that Massachusetts, prior to 1820, had the power to create law that would 
be binding in the then District of Maine.  But, as convenient a 
transitional mechanism as it may have seemed in 1819, Massachusetts 
could not pass a law like section 6 of the Act of Separation that would 
bind the soon to be created State of Maine to accept “all the laws which 
shall be in force in the District of Maine” and further, direct that this 
body of law “shall remain, and be in force, within [Maine] until altered 
or repealed by the [Maine] Legislature.”150  Such alterations or repeal 
might not take place for years, but more important, that’s not how 
concepts of equality among the several states works.151   
It is axiomatic that a legislative body in one state cannot by 
enactment export a specific law (or a body of law), with the intention that 
it take effect on a given future date, binding citizens and institutions in 
another state.  It’s simply not possible; states are separate, equal, 
independent, sovereign bodies.  One state cannot dictate the law of 
another state.  Upon statehood,152 Maine became a separate sovereign 
state, and Massachusetts law, having no binding force or effect beyond 
the borders of Massachusetts, ceased operating in Maine.  The 
Massachusetts Legislature never had the legal power to create the first 
iteration of Maine law; that was a task that could only be performed by a 
Maine legislature.  
                                            
 149. With respect to the making, repeal, or amendment of law, the constitutional 
language speaks only of action by the “Legislature”—there is no mention of “judicial 
usage” or “judicial legislation.” 
 150. An Act Relating to the Separation of the District of Maine from Massachusetts 
Proper, and Forming the Same into a Separate and Independent State, 1822 Me. Laws 16. 
 151. See U.S. CONST. art. IV. 
 152. Maine became a state on March 15, 1820. 
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Had the Massachusetts Legislature, in 1819, passed a much softer 
“resolve” that merely advised the soon-to-be-created State of Maine to 
adopt, as a first order of legislative business, the body of law then in 
existence in the District of Maine, and had that first Maine Legislature so 
acted, the transitional result sought may well have been largely achieved.  
But that did not happen.  Instead, the first Maine Legislature began a 
long process of carefully examining (accepting, rejecting, revising) 
Massachusetts statutory law.  This was a valid way in which to proceed 
given the fact that the Maine Legislature was then the only body with the 
legal power to fashion Maine law.153   
The argument that Maine’s constitutional language,154 achieves on its 
own what Massachusetts’ Act of Separation could not achieve is 
similarly flawed. The argument fails to take into account the limiting 
phrase: “and not repugnant to this Constitution.”  The Bell I court 
reasoned that the alienation of all of Maine’s intertidal land grows out of 
the peremptory adoption of “all” Massachusetts law in 1820.155  Leaving 
aside for the moment the question of whether a Maine Legislature ever in 
fact adopted “all” Massachusetts law (the amicus briefs argued that it did 
not),156 this total alienation of all intertidal land in Maine is “repugnant” 
to the Maine Constitution’s Legislative Powers Clause. The Law Court, 
citing Illinois Central, took this position in its 1981 Opinion of the 
Justices.157 
Summarizing this argument: the Bell I court’s conclusion that upon 
statehood in 1820, Massachusetts law (by virtue of the two critical 
enactments identified in the court’s opinion) became the law of Maine, is 
both legally and logically unsupportable.  The court ignores the 
limitations within these enactments.  It ignores the logic and reasoning of 
the Submerged Lands Act, and the Opinion of the Justices sustaining the 
Act.  It ignores the equal-footing doctrine.  It fails to acknowledge that 
one state may not impose its laws on another state, and that Maine’s 
adoption of a Constitution (a general document laying out a 
governmental structure, and the rights and duties of the people and those 
who govern) does not constitute the wholesale adoption of Massachusetts 
law.  These errors, individually, and taken together, require that Bell I be 
overturned. 
                                            
 153. See supra note 143. 
 154. See generally ME. CONST., art X, § 3. 
 155. Bell I, 510 A.2d 509, 513-514 (Me. 1986). 
 156. See supra notes 140-148, and accompanying text. 
 157. See Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597, 609-10 (1981). 
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VIII.  ARGUMENT: ISSUE V 
If the Law Court reexamines Bell I, we reach Issue V: 
 
Whether the Bell I court erred in failing to treat the legislatively 
adopted Submerged Lands Act158 as an implicit assertion of title to 
intertidal land in Maine. 
 
The amicus briefs argued that the Bell I court had erred in failing to 
treat the legislatively adopted Submerged Lands Act as an implicit 
assertion of title to intertidal land in Maine.  The Bell I opinion seems 
troubled by the lack of firm legislative authorization (both in 
Massachusetts and in Maine) of the Ordinance as the granting instrument 
of all intertidal land in the two states.159  It should have been.  The court 
in an earlier Maine case, Barrows v. McDermott, was similarly troubled:  
It may well be that the Ordinance has no force by virtue of 
positive enactment by any legislative body having jurisdiction at 
the time of such enactment over what is now the county of 
Piscataquis, and that its [the Ordinance’s] operation has never 
been extended there by any specific act of legislation since; and 
it is quite true that when under the [1692] charter of William and 
Mary, [the Ordinance was] . . . re-enacted [it] . . . was never in 
terms extended to the Plymouth colony or to Maine under any 
legislative sanction.160   
Undaunted, the Bell I court asserts in several different word 
formulations that long usage, “judicial acceptance,” or what it terms “a 
piece of judicial legislation,” is sufficient authority for both the grant 
itself and the court’s conclusion with respect to the finality of the 
alienation of intertidal lands in the two states.161  To support these views 
the Bell I court takes refuge in the same reasoning that allowed the 
Barrows court to extricate itself from the dilemma it saw, i.e. that there 
was no legislative alienation (in either state) of all intertidal land.  Both 
courts reasoned as follows:  
But [the Ordinance] has been so often and so fully recognized by 
the courts both in this State and in Massachusetts as a familiar 
                                            
 158. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 1861-1867 (2005) (formerly enacted as ME. REV. STAT. 
tit. 12 § 559 (1997)). 
 159. Bell I, 510 A.2d at 511-512. 
 160. Barrows v. McDermott, 73 Me. 441, 447-448 (1882).  
 161. Bell I, 510 A.2d at 513-514.  
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part of the common law of both, throughout their entire extent, 
without regard to its source or its limited original force as a piece 
of legislation for the colony of Massachusetts Bay, that we could 
not but regard it as a piece of judicial legislation to do away with 
any part of it or to fail to give it its due force throughout the 
State until it shall have been changed by the proper law making 
power.162 
At its root, the argument offered by both courts is that judicial error, 
persisted in over a long period of time, becomes law and is tantamount to 
a legislative enactment.  The amicus briefs urged a rejection of this 
proposition, asserting that it stands the concept of truth and justice on its 
head. 
However, bad grammar aside, the last clause of both Barrows and 
Bell I’s “judicial usage” reasoning makes an important bow to legislative 
power.  It suggests that “judicial usage,” or “judicial legislation,” must 
give way to changes wrought by “the proper law making power.”  This 
can only be the legislative branch of government.163 
But this seeming deference to separation of powers principles, and to 
legislative powers in particular, becomes mere rhetoric given the Bell I 
court’s failure to examine the relatively recently enacted Submerged 
Lands Act which addressed title to filled, intertidal, and submerged 
land.164  The court referred to this legislation (without discussion) only 
obliquely, and then went on to brush aside as “not binding upon this 
court” the Opinion of the Justices that thoroughly examined the Act and 
the 1981 amendment to the Act.165  This Opinion of the Justices found 
the legislation to be both necessary and appropriate as “a statute of 
repose” and concluded, “[i]t is our opinion that L.D. 1594 does not 
exceed the constitutional power of the Legislature.”166 
One might ask why the amicus briefs suggested that the 1981 
legislation only implicitly asserts Maine’s title to its intertidal lands.  The 
short answer is that the legislation is unequivocal in asserting the state’s 
                                            
 162. Id. at 514 (quoting Barrows, 73 Me. at 448) (emphasis added).  
 163. The amicus briefs consistently took the position that all of the intertidal land in 
two states cannot be alienated to littoral upland owners merely by a “judicial usage,” “a 
piece of judicial legislation.”  The latter phrase seems on its face to be an oxymoron—a 
violation of separation of powers principles.  There must at some point be a valid 
legislative enactment defining a state’s intertidal land law.  
 164. ME REV. STAT. ANN, tit 12, §§ 1861-1867 (2005).   This legislation was originally 
enacted in 1975; an important amendment releasing the state’s ownership interest in 
certain parcels of filled intertidal and submerged land was adopted in 1981.  
 165. Bell I, 510 A.2d at 516.  
 166. Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597, 606 (Me. 1981).  
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title only with respect to submerged land, land that is below mean low or 
100 rods from mean high (whichever is less) and extends seaward.  But 
this is true in all states, including Massachusetts; it is a truism not 
affected by the Colonial Ordinance, it was true under English common 
law, and earlier.167  The more ambiguous implicit assertion of title to 
intertidal lands derives from the provision in the legislation aimed at 
cleaning up uncertainties with respect to the title of upland littoral 
owners who filled (often years ago) intertidal or submerged land (or 
both). Specifically the legislation states: “[t]itles to properties and lands 
that once were or may have been submerged or intertidal lands subject 
to the State’s ownership in public trust that were filled by October 1, 
1975 are declared and released to the owners of any such filled lands by 
the State . . . .”168  Logically this language implicitly suggests that the 
Legislature believes it has title to both filled intertidal and submerged 
land (in trust for the public) that a discreet number of private owners 
need and want.  Undoubtedly, mortgage lenders, title insurers, municipal 
taxing authorities, those who potentially would develop these parcels 
also supported this legislative amendment because it clarifies the title of 
these upland owners. 
Beyond asserting title to these intertidal and submerged lands (albeit 
the assertion is only implicit to intertidal land), the State indicated a 
willingness to release its title interest to these discreet filled parcels of 
land when such alienation served valid public interests.169  This 
legislative intent certainly parallels Illinois’ legislative actions sustained 
in Illinois Central.170  In finding Maine’s legislative amendment 
appropriate, the above noted Opinion of the Justices cited Illinois 
Central, and also found that any number of valid public interests were 
served by this limited alienation of state property.171    
The Opinion of the Justices did not comment on the mistaken 
legislative assertion that the state’s title to submerged land derived from 
the Colonial Ordinance.  It took no issue with the implicit legislative 
assertion of title to intertidal lands, but noted that only the Parliament or 
the Legislature, as the people’s representative, could alienate the jus 
                                            
 167. The statement in the legislation, tit. 12, § 1865(1), that the ownership of 
submerged lands and the public trust imposed on these lands derives from the Colonial 
Ordinance is factually incorrect.  The Ordinance only purported to affect lands between 
mean high and mean low up to 100 rods.  Submerged land begins at mean low or 100 
rods from mean high (whichever is less) and extends seaward.  
 168. See tit. 12, § 1861(3) (emphasis added). 
 169. See Cheung, supra note 79, at 126. 
 170. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. 387 (1982).  
 171. Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597, 609 (Me. 1981). 
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publicum.172  And, importantly, it pointedly noted that if the Legislature 
had sought to alienate all or most of the state’s intertidal trust property, 
as the original Illinois Central grant did, that such action would violate 
the Legislative Powers Clause of the Maine Constitution.173  
Parenthetically, one wonders how the Justices would have handled the 
assertion that a “judicial usage” could (according to Barrows and Bell I) 
accomplish this very impermissible end.  This issue, quite obviously, was 
not before the court when it fashioned its 1981 Opinion of the Justices.  
The Submerged Lands Act is not the strongest legislative declaration 
of public rights, duties, ownership of, and title to intertidal lands in 
Maine that one might hope for.  But this was the first time since 
statehood that a Maine legislature directed its attention to any of these 
issues and then only to fashion a piece of remedial legislation.  Had the 
1981 Legislature realized that no Maine Legislature had ever fashioned a 
unique body of Maine law with respect to intertidal lands (as the equal-
footing doctrine entitled it to do), a more forthright assertion of public 
intertidal land rights, the scope of the jus publicum, public trust rights 
and duties might well have been articulated.  This is a task that still 
awaits legislative attention.  
In sum, the Bell I court, instead of embracing the reservations in 
Barrows, chose to pay mere lip service to “the proper law making 
power.”174  It could have recognized the implicit legislative assertion of 
title to intertidal lands embedded in the Submerged Lands Act.  It could 
have embraced and built on the positive aspects of the 1981 Opinion of 
the Justices interpreting this Act.  The Bell I court could have raised a 
series of unanswered questions that might have prompted the Legislature 
to look holistically, for the first time, at Maine’s intertidal land law.  The 
Bell I court did none of these things. 
Relying instead on the hook of “judicial usage,” “a piece of judicial 
legislation,” it tied Maine’s intertidal land law to the law of 
Massachusetts, a law predicated on a 350 year-old Ordinance (arguably 
misinterpreted at least since Alger), a law that had little relevance at the 
time of Maine’s statehood, and less relevance today.175  The Bell I court 
ignored the Submerged Lands Act.  It ignored a timely, relevant, and 
unanimous opinion of the Law Court.  These are errors that the Law 
Court can now correct. 
                                            
 172. Id. at 605. 
 173. Id. at 609. 
 174. Bell I, 510 A.2d 509, 514 (Me. 1986). 
 175. Id.    
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IX.  ARGUMENT: ISSUE VI 
If the Law Court reexamines Bell II, we reach Issue VI:  
 
Whether the Bell II court erred in its uncritical acceptance of the 
holdings in Bell I, given the intervening U.S. Supreme Court holding in 
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi?   
 
The amicus briefs argued that the Bell II court’s failure to fully 
address Phillips Petroleum, and the application of the equal-footing 
doctrine in Maine, in particular, was reversible error.176  In the brief 
period between the Law Court’s Bell I and Bell II decisions, the U.S. 
Supreme Court handed down its decision in the Phillips Petroleum case.  
The Bell II court acknowledges Phillips Petroleum, but, without a word 
of analysis, brushes it off as a “revisionist view of history [that] comes 
too late by at least 157 years.”177  Rather than drawing on Phillips 
Petroleum (or its predecessor Shively) to re-examine whether Bell I 
grasped the full significance of the equal-footing doctrine,178 the Bell II 
court states, in what can only be described as a non-sequitur: “[t]he 
Phillips Petroleum . . . decision . . . in no way contradicts the plain and 
carefully explained decision in . . . Shively.”179  Of course it doesn’t.  
Phillips Petroleum was not urged on the Bell II court because it 
contradicts Shively.   
On the contrary, the importance of Phillips Petroleum lies in the fact 
that it reinforces, reinvigorates, and shows the continuing vitality of the 
equal-footing doctrine, which the Bell I court ignored in its analysis of 
Shively.  The Bell II court failed to look at the Bell I holding critically 
and failed in its own right to properly analyze the equal-footing doctrine 
as it is laid out first in Shively and subsequently in Phillips Petroleum.  
Consequently, the State of Maine has not yet had the benefit of the equal-
                                            
 176. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Miss., 484 U.S. 469 (1988). 
 177. Bell II, 557 A.2d 168, 172 (Me. 1989).  This dismissive remark would be 
humorous if it were not so unfortunate.  The fact that the Phillips Petroleum Court, 
relying on the equal-footing doctrine, confirmed Mississippi’s title to its tidelands 171 
years after Mississippi became a state, is something other than “revisionist history”—it is 
doing justice, correcting long-standing error, albeit late in the day.  Maine’s highest court 
can, and should, do likewise. 
 178. Remember that Bell I totally ignored the equal-footing doctrine in its analysis of 
the issues before it.  See supra Issue III. 
 179. Bell II, 557 A.2d at 172.  The Bell II court seems to suggest that the Phillips 
Petroleum case must contradict Shively in order to be relevant—wrong.  Exactly the 
opposite is true—what is needed and found in Phillips Petroleum is a strong 
reinforcement of Shively’s articulation of the equal-footing doctrine.   
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footing doctrine in delineating its own intertidal land law.   Turning now 
to the language of Phillips Petroleum, Justice White, speaking for the 
Court, begins by stating the case, the Mississippi Supreme Court’s 
disposition of the case, and the U.S. Supreme Court’s disposition of the 
case: 
The State of Mississippi, however, claim[s] that by virtue of the 
equal-footing doctrine it acquired at the time of statehood and 
held in public trust all land lying under any waters influenced by 
the tide, whether navigable or not . . . . The Mississippi Supreme 
Court, affirming the Chancery Court with respect to the lands at 
issue here, held that by virtue of becoming a State, Mississippi 
acquired “fee simple title to all lands naturally subject to tidal 
influence . . . . We granted certiorari to review the Mississippi 
Supreme Court’s decision, and now affirm the judgment 
below.180 
Justice White, characterizing Shively as “‘the seminal case in 
American public trust Jurisprudence,’”181 then cites the core holding of 
Shively: “‘[t]he new States admitted into the Union since the adoption of 
the Constitution have the same rights as the original States in the tide 
waters, and in the lands under them, within their respective 
jurisdictions.’”182  Justice White then cites from Knight v. United States 
Land Association183 the precise passage previously cited in the Issue III 
argument above.184  Justice White, immediately after his citation from 
Knight continues, “[o]n many occasions, before and since, this Court has 
stated or restated these words from Knight and Shively.”185  Buttressing 
this statement, Justice White references ten different federal and state 
court cases.186  Justice White then concludes the part of the Phillips 
Petroleum opinion that deals with the equal-footing doctrine: 
Consequently, we reaffirm our longstanding precedents which 
hold that the States, upon entry into the Union, received 
ownership of all lands under waters subject to the ebb and flow 
of the tide.  Under the well-established principles of our cases, 
                                            
 180. Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 472-73 (citations and footnotes omitted).  
 181. Id. at 473. 
 182. Id. at 474.  Interestingly, there is a very slight word difference (but no substantive 
difference) between the actual language of Shively, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894), and Justice 
White’s citation of Shively noted above. 
 183. Knight v. U.S. Land Ass’n, 142 U.S. 161 (1891). 
 184. See supra note 116, and accompanying text.  
 185. Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 474.  
 186. Id. at 474-475, nn.2-3. 
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the decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court is clearly correct: 
the lands at issue here are under tide waters, and therefore passed 
to the State of Mississippi upon its entrance into the Union.187 
Both the Shively and Phillips Petroleum Courts understood, and laid 
out, the prevailing view in the United States with respect to intertidal 
land rights—that the upland owner’s right/title did not extend below the 
mean high tide line.  At the same time, both Courts acknowledged (as 
had the Illinois Central Court) that some states, Massachusetts among 
them, had (in order to facilitate “wharfing out”) enlarged upland owner’s 
rights in intertidal lands.  Whether these enlarged rights constituted “fee 
title,” a “qualified” fee, a “qualified” property, a mere license, or a 
defeasible estate was for each of these states to decide.188   
The Bell I and Bell II courts seem clear (more clear than 
Massachusetts’ highest court) that Massachusetts law, by virtue of the 
Ordinance and long acquiescence to a judicial usage, gave upland owners 
fee simple title to all intertidal lands.  And both Bell courts reasoned that, 
because Maine was once a part of Massachusetts and grew as a state out 
of Massachusetts, then Maine too, by the same Ordinance and judicial 
usage, alienated its intertidal lands to littoral upland owners.189  But this 
reasoning has been expressly rejected as inconsistent with the equal-
                                            
 187. Id. at 476-77.     
 188. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s Boston Waterfront decision contains 
a lengthy discussion examining alternative possibilities as to the nature of the property 
right upland owners in Massachusetts have in intertidal land.  Boston Waterfront Dev. 
Corp. v. Mass 393 N.E.2d 356, 363-367 (Mass. 1979).  Though some are adamant in their 
view that the Ordinance conveyed fee title to all intertidal land in the state to upland 
owners, the Boston Waterfront court at several points acknowledges that the law is less 
than clear: “[p]ast decisions of this court have been inconsistent in their treatment of the 
relationship between wharfing privileges and ownership of the soil under the wharf.”  Id. 
at 363.  Its holding clearly suggests that any title held by the upland owner in this case is 
defeasible: “[w]e therefore hold that the BWDC has title to its property in fee simple, but 
subject to the condition subsequent that it be used for the public purpose for which it was 
granted.” Id. at 367.  A similar case in Vermont, Vermont v. Central Vermont Railway, 
citing Boston Waterfront, involved lands underlying navigable waters in Vermont.  Vt. v. 
Cent. Vt. Ry., 571 A.2d 1128 (Vt. 1989).   There, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded 
that the land was held in trust by the state for the people.  Id. at 1135.  The grant, the 
court explained, was for the purpose of erecting wharves and extending railroad 
service—these activities for the most part no longer exist.  Id. at 1129.  The court held 
that the railroad held title subject to a condition subsequent. Id. at 1135.  The parallels to 
the issues before the Law Court seem clear.    
 189. See Bell I, 510 A.2d 509, 513 (Me. 1986); Bell II, 557 A.2d 168, 171 (Me. 1989). 
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footing doctrine by a long line of U.S. Supreme Court cases, e.g., 
Pollard, Knight, Shively, and now Phillips Petroleum.190 
For our purposes, the Pollard case is most interesting;191 just as 
Maine was formed out of Massachusetts, the State of Alabama was 
formed in 1819 from territory formerly part of the State of Georgia.  The 
case involved a dispute over title to a parcel of intertidal land; the title 
asserted by plaintiff below had its roots in early pre-statehood Spanish 
grants said to have been confirmed by the United States.192  Whether the 
law of Georgia would have confirmed that title had a pre-statehood title 
dispute arisen with respect to the parcel was not a matter before the 
Pollard Court.  What was before the Court was Alabama’s contention 
that it held title (in trust for the public) to all intertidal land, based on its 
newly acquired statehood, and the equal-footing doctrine.193  The U.S. 
Supreme Court agreed with Alabama, noting: “[w]hen Alabama was 
admitted into the union, on an equal footing with the original states, she 
succeeded to all the rights of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and eminent 
domain which Georgia possessed at the date of the cession . . . .”194  The 
Pollard Court went on: 
Alabama is, therefore, entitled to the sovereignty and jurisdiction 
over all the territory within her limits, subject to the common 
law, to the same extent that Georgia possessed it . . . . To 
maintain any other doctrine, is to deny that Alabama has been 
admitted into the union on an equal footing with the original 
states . . . . When the Revolution took place, the people of each 
state became themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the 
absolute right to all their navigable waters, and the soils under 
them for their own common use, subject only to the rights since 
surrendered by the Constitution.  Then to Alabama belong the 
                                            
 190. The Pollard Court said it first and perhaps best: “new states [are] admitted into the 
Union . . . on an equal-footing with the original states . . . .”  Pollard v. Hogan, 44 U.S. 
212, 222 (1845). 
 191. A careful analysis of the Pollard case as it related to Martin formed a significant 
portion of the Issue III argument.  The use of Pollard in this Issue VI argument focuses 
on the parallel status of Georgia/Alabama on one hand, and Massachusetts/Maine on the 
other. The line of reasoning and citations to Pollard in this argument are different from 
those in the earlier argument but underscore the significance of the errors (of both Bell 
courts) in refusing to examine Phillips Petroleum and/or Shively, which would have led 
the courts to Pollard and the weight given to the equal- footing doctrine by the U. S. 
Supreme Court. 
 192. Pollard, 44 U.S. at 219.  
 193. Id. at 220-21. 
 194. Id. at 223. 
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navigable waters, and soils under them, in controversy in this 
case . . . .195 
In sum, when a portion of an existing state (e.g., Georgia or 
Massachusetts) is separated for the purpose of forming a new state (e.g., 
Alabama or Maine) the equal-footing doctrine holds that the law of the 
parent state does not ipso facto become the law of the newly created 
state.  Law in the new state is a function of that state’s legislature.   In 
fact, the Pollard and Phillips Petroleum holdings go a step further; they 
recognize that new states such as Maine, under the equal-footing 
doctrine, “hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters, and the 
soils under them for their own common use.”196  Presumably, these rights 
can only be lost or modified by enactments of the legislature of the new 
state.  
Finally, we must deal substantively with the Bell II court’s assertion 
that acceptance of the equal-footing doctrine at this time would be 
“revisionist . . . history”197—that it would upset settled expectations, and 
be (as Bell I argued), “fraught with mischief.”198  The petitioners in 
Phillips Petroleum certainly pressed the Court with these same 
arguments, asserting:  
that the Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision is inequitable and 
would upset various . . . kinds of property expectations and 
interests [which] have matured since Mississippi joined the 
Union in 1817[,] . . . that they have developed reasonable 
expectations based on their record title for these lands, and that 
they . . . have paid taxes on these lands for more than a 
century.199 
The Phillips Petroleum Court was not moved by this importuning, 
and the holding in the case flatly rejects these arguments.  Reaching back 
171 years, the Court held: “[w]e are skeptical . . . that a decision 
affirming the judgment below will have sweeping implications, either 
within Mississippi or outside that state . . . . Indeed, we believe that it 
would be far more upsetting to settled expectations to reverse the 
                                            
 195. Id. at 228-29; the Pollard Court reaffirms the equal-footing doctrine and 
Alabama’s right thereunder by citing (almost verbatim) a portion of Chief Justice Taney’s 
reasoning in Martin.  See supra note 127; compare Martin, 41 U.S. 367, 410, with the 
above citation. 
 196. See Pollard, 44 U.S. at 229. 
 197. Bell II, 557 A.2d 168, 172 (Me. 1989).   
 198. Bell I, 510 A.2d 509, 514 (Me. 1986). 
 199. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Miss., 484 U.S. 469, 481-82 (1988). 
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Mississippi Supreme Court decision.”200  The Phillips Petroleum Court 
went on: “[t]he fact that petitioners have long been the record title 
holders, or long paid taxes on these lands does not change the outcome 
here . . . . Consequently, we do not believe that the equitable 
considerations petitioners advance divest the State of its ownership in the 
disputed tidelands.”201  In closing the Phillips Petroleum Court also 
noted, “that under Mississippi law, the State’s ownership of these 
[intertidal] lands could not be lost via adverse possession, laches, or any 
other equitable doctrine.”202  In short, Mississippi’s intertidal lands could 
not be lost merely by the passage of time.  The Law Court is urged to 
take a similar view with respect to Maine’s intertidal lands. 
Summarizing more broadly, it seems clear that the Bell II court’s 
failure to appreciate the reaffirming weight given to the equal-footing 
doctrine in the Phillips Petroleum case, coupled with its failure to 
recognize that the Bell I court had either overlooked or ignored the 
significance of the equal-footing doctrine in its use of the Shively case, 
was error.  These errors, (by both Bell courts) in turn, led both courts to 
miss the significance of cases such as Pollard, Knight, and Martin, all of 
which explained the meaning and scope of the equal-footing doctrine—a 
doctrine certainly meant to apply to all new states, including Maine.  
Given this continuous body of U.S. Supreme Court case law, the 
amicus briefs’ argued that the Bell II court’s holding should be reversed 
by the Law Court.  The Maine Legislature should (at long last) be given 
the opportunity to exercise the equal-footing doctrine to determine Maine 
law with respect to intertidal lands. 
X.  ARGUMENT: ISSUE VII 
If the Law Court reexamines Bell II, we reach Issue VII:  
 
Whether the Bell II court erred in narrowly interpreting the public 
uses permitted in the intertidal zone pursuant to the “public easement” 
recognized in the Bell cases.   
 
The amicus briefs argued that the Bell II court’s conclusion that 
public uses are permitted, but “only” 203 for fishing, fowling, and 
navigation, was unduly narrow.  The court failed to apply relevant 
                                            
 200. Id. at 482-83. 
 201. Id. at 484. 
 202. Id.  
 203. Bell II, 557 A.2d 168, 169 (Me. 1989). 
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property law rules of statutory construction (and case law construing 
these rules) to delineate the scope of the “public easement.”  It further 
erred in failing to acknowledge the much broader range of public use 
rights implicit in the historical concept of jus publicum. 
If arguments leading to this point are rejected, or, put another way, if 
the Law Court leaves in place the central holdings of Bell I and Bell II, 
i.e., that upland owners in Maine hold fee simple title to intertidal lands, 
subject only to a reserved “public easement,” then “the only question 
presented [to the Bell II court, and to the Law Court today] is the scope” 
(the breadth) of these reserved public rights on what is now characterized 
as privately owned intertidal land.204  This is the question addressed now. 
As noted earlier, the Ordinance is the asserted founding document of 
this vast alienation of jus publicum property (the intertidal lands of two 
states).  But, also noted is the fact that the Ordinance is not a deed; it is 
not a conventional grant or conveyance of property; it is not the product 
of any bargain.  If the Storer v. Freeman case205 is accepted at face value, 
the Ordinance was widely viewed as an inducement to “wharf out”—an 
inducement without any time frame, and one that did not impose any 
reciprocal duties on the grantees.  It was a gift.  No other characterization 
of this conferred property interest seems possible.   
It seems appropriate, then, to examine both conventional property 
law rules of construction, and case law applying such rules, to determine 
(as Bell II says we must) “the scope of the rights . . . reserved to the 
public.”206  A leading American treatise on property law puts it this way: 
“[i]t seems reasonable to attribute to the average transferor an intention 
that produces a result which is more in accord with the public interest, 
whenever the language he has employed in a donative transaction is 
susceptible of different interpretations.  Consequently, a preference to 
this effect has been recognized.”207 
The same treatise points out that when a grantor, who at the outset 
has the full quantum of rights, both transfers rights to a grantee, and 
retains rights (as the Ordinance is said to have done) the grantor 
has/retains the residuum of rights (whether by the fiction of “re-grant” or 
a more straight forward “reservation”).208  In other words, the Ordinance 
gave grantee(s) what they needed in order to “wharf out,” title in the 
                                            
 204. Id.   
 205. 6 Mass. 435 (1810). 
 206. Bell II, 557 A.2d at 173.   
 207. 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 21.3(d) (1952) (emphasis added); see also 
Delogu, supra note 103, at 46-47, 50-51.     
 208. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 8.24-8.25 (1952) (emphasis added).     
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underlying flats—nothing more.  Everything else embodied in the 
concept of jus publicum, the residuum of public rights in the foreshore, 
remained (and remains to this day) in the hands of government in trust 
for the public.209   
In addition, the treatise makes clear that a grant that is made 
gratuitously, that lacks consideration (as was the case with the 
Ordinance), is to be construed narrowly against the grantee:  
In ascertaining the meaning of a conveyance for the purpose of 
determining the scope of an [interest] created by it, account 
should be taken of the nature of the conveyance as being 
gratuitous or based upon a consideration . . . . In the case of a 
gratuitous conveyance, less account need be taken of the 
meaning of the conveyance to the grantee.210  
Here again, conventional property law rules of construction suggest 
that the Bell II court should have read private upland owner rights 
narrowly, and should have read the “public easement,” the “reserved” 
rights, expansively.  The Bell II court, however, did the exact opposite.  
The upland owners—grantees under the Ordinance—gave nothing for 
what they received, but their rights were significantly enlarged by Bell 
II’s holding—public rights were narrowed. 
Turning to the case law, both Bell courts relied on Alger,211which the 
Bell II court characterized as “a leading case construing and applying the 
Ordinance.”212  Chief Justice Shaw, speaking for the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court in Alger, noted: 
When therefore the government did, by such general act [the 
Ordinance] grant a right of separate property in the soil of the 
sea-shore, to enable the riparian proprietor to erect quays and 
wharves for a better access to the sea, and by the same act 
reserved some right to individuals and the public of passing and 
re-passing with vessels, but without defining it, it seems just and 
reasonable to construe such reservation much more liberally in 
                                            
 209. It should also be noted that there is no historical evidence—nothing in the 
Ordinance itself, or in cases like Storer, Alger, or Boston Waterfront that a secondary 
intent of the Ordinance was to limit or narrow public use rights in the foreshore.  That 
motive did not exist in 1647.  In the minds of many it was not thought possible.  In 
Massachusetts and Maine, exclusion of the public, and/or limiting public use rights in the 
foreshore is a product of late twentieth century private property rights zealotry. 
 210. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.67 (1952) (emphasis added).   
 211. 61 Mass. 53 (1851). 
 212. Bell II, 557 A.2d 168, 171 n.10 (Me. 1989). 
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favor of the right[s] reserved, than it otherwise would be under 
other circumstances.213  
The court in Commonwealth v. City of Roxbury took a similar 
position: 
[The Colonial Government] held a prerogative right to the sea 
and sea shores, in a fiduciary relation, for the public use. As a 
general rule, in all grants from the government to the subject, 
the terms of the grant are to be taken most strongly against the 
grantee, and in favor of the grantor — reversing the common 
rule as between individuals.214   
At another point in this opinion, Justice Shaw (who also authored the 
Alger opinion) speaking of the scope of what he called the publici juris 
(reserved public rights) characterized them as being, “for the use and 
benefit of all the subjects, for all useful purposes, the principal of which 
were navigation and the fisheries.”215  In other words, one of the 
foremost members of Massachusetts’ judiciary, a scholar in his day, 
looking back on almost 200 years of post-Ordinance history understood 
the appropriate rule/method of statutory construction to be applied in 
interpreting reserved public rights.  He also understood the fact that those 
rights included “all useful purposes”—navigation and fisheries were 
important uses, but they were not the only reserved public uses 
permitted.216    
Beyond these treatise rules of statutory construction, and cases 
applying and interpreting these rules, there is further support for this 
argument in the fact that the so-called “public easement” is rooted in the 
jus publicum, which in turn is rooted in the Justinian view that some 
things are inherently incapable of private ownership—the air, running 
                                            
 213. Alger, 61 Mass. at 94 (emphasis added).  A reading of all of pages 94-95 seems 
useful.  
 214. Commonwealth v. City of Roxbury, 75 Mass. 451, 492 (Mass. 1857) (emphasis 
added).   
 215. Id. at 483 (emphasis added). 
 216. See also Home for Aged Women v. Commonwealth, 89 N.E. 124 (Mass. 1909).  
The court takes the position that the trust for the public, under which the state holds and 
controls navigable tidewaters, encompasses more than navigation alone—“[i]t is wider in 
its scope, and it includes all necessary and proper uses, in the interest of the public.” Id. at 
129.  The Boston Waterfront case, beyond its discussion of (post-Ordinance) ambiguities 
in Massachusetts law with respect to upland owner property rights, also suggests at 
several points that reserved public rights were not intended to be, and were not always, 
narrowly construed.  Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp., 393 N.E.2d 356 (1979). 
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water, the sea, and the foreshore—an essential interface between dry land 
and the sea. 217    
The underlying principle of jus publicum in the foreshore grew out of 
a belief that this intertidal land area was of necessity public—open to all, 
and essentially without limit as to uses. One may as readily dig for 
clams, as dive for sponges—or, in Maine, sea urchins.  One may use the 
foreshore for lateral passage, or to launch a small boat from which one 
might fish or travel to another point along the foreshore, or simply sail 
for pleasure.  One could engage in vast seaborne commerce, launch war 
canoes, dry or repair ones nets, or simply sit and watch the sea.218  From 
time immemorial, all of these jus publicum and public use activities have 
been conducted on the foreshore of Massachusetts, Maine, and every 
other state and nation in the world which borders the sea.  Different uses 
were more or less important at different times.  The jus publicum was 
infinitely adaptable to the changing needs of a given time and place; that 
was the purpose and the beauty of the concept.219     
For our purposes, the point to be made is that nothing in the 
Ordinance (or in any case law purporting to interpret the Ordinance) 
suggests that the jus publicum was intended to be abrogated or limited.  
This point bears repeating—the Ordinance, the purported source of the 
upland owner’s title, and the public’s remaining reserved rights, does not 
use the terms “only” or “delimit[ed]” to circumscribe public use rights.  
If one looks at the four lines of the Ordinance said to convey title to 
intertidal lands, or the whole of the section titled Liberties Common, or 
the whole Book of the General Lawes and Libertyes, one cannot find any 
indication that public use rights, jus publicum, was to be “limited” to 
fishing, fowling, and navigation—that these were the “only” public use 
rights remaining and reserved as part of the jus publicum.  This concept 
                                            
 217. Justinian codes date back almost 1500 years and themselves are based on so-
called “natural law.”  See Tannenbaum, supra note 46, at 107-110.  
 218. See G. Graham Waite, Public Rights in Maine Waters, 17 ME. L. REV. 161 (1965), 
particularly, “The Meaning of the Trust Doctrine in Maine” at 176-178, and “Public 
Rights of Access to Waterways and to the Ocean,” at 185-188. 
 219. To the extent that this foreshore area could be said to be owned, the sovereign or 
state was said to be a trustee, the holder of this unique property interest, in trust for the 
people.  See Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597, 599, 605-609 (Me. 1981).  Moreover, 
the sovereign or state must meet fiduciary duties, inherent in the role of trustee, to protect 
(by imposing necessary regulations) both the foreshore itself, and the jus publicum.  
Finally, in most jurisdictions, including Maine, it is clear that the jus publicum cannot be 
lost by prescription or adverse possession.  It cannot be given away.  It can be alienated, 
but only to a limited degree, and then only by legislative action, when larger public 
interests are served.  See also Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural 
Resources Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 475-478 (1970). 
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of limitation is simply not there.  It’s not implied, and it’s certainly not in 
the language of the Ordinance. 
In short, the Bell II court’s holding that the reserved public easement 
may be used “only for fishing, fowling, and navigation”220 is an 
unwarranted judicially fashioned fiction.  To be sure, fishing, fowling, 
and navigation are specifically mentioned in the Ordinance as permitted 
public uses—they were examples of the most common and the most 
obvious public uses of the day.  But there is no suggestion in the critical 
four lines of the Ordinance, the Liberties Common, or the Book of the 
General Lawes and Libertyes that a rule of ejusdem generis was to be 
applied; that the drafters of the Ordinance intended to exclude any/all 
other public uses; that the historic elasticity of the concept of jus 
publicum, was to be frozen in time; that new public uses of intertidal land 
that could not be fitted into the rubrics of fishing, fowling, navigation, 
would be barred forever; or, that upland owners (beyond the title 
conferred) would forevermore have the right to exclude people and uses 
that could not fit themselves into the stated rubrics.   It’s preposterous—
these intentions and motives did not exist in 1647.  There is no 
suggestion that they existed in any of the documents noted above, and no 
such suggestion has been found in any colonial histories, or in the 
writings of any legal historians, to permit the inference that limiting the 
jus publicum rights was one of the intentions of those who drafted the 
Ordinance. 
On the contrary, there is considerable evidence (at least in Maine) 
that the explicit limitations fashioned by the Bell II court did not exist 
prior to that court’s holding.221  For example, no Maine case can be 
                                            
 220. See Bell II, 557 A.2d 168, 169 (Me. 1989).    
 221. At this point the Bell II court is in something of a dilemma—it has fashioned an 
unwarranted limitation on public use rights and rigidly applied it to the case at hand.  But, 
at the same time, it must acknowledge a body of Maine case law holding that ‘fishing,’ 
‘fowling,’ and ‘navigation’ uses may be undertaken for pleasure or commercial purposes, 
or to provide sustenance.  See e.g., Barrows v. McDermott, 73 Me. 441, 449 (1882).  
Other cases cited in the Bell II opinion have sympathetically interpreted what is 
encompassed within the terms fishing, fowling, and navigation.   
For example, the operator of a power boat for hire may pick up and land his 
passengers on intertidal land, Andrews v. King, 129 A. 298 (1925); and 
“navigation” also includes the right to travel over frozen waters, French v. Camp, 
18 Me. 433 (1841), to moor vessels and discharge and take on cargo on intertidal 
land, State v. Wilson, 42 Me. 9, 24 (1856); and, after landing, “to pass freely to the 
lands and houses of others besides the owners of the flats,” Deering v. Proprietors 
of Long Wharf, 25 Me. 51, 65 (1845). Similarly, we have broadly construed 
“fishing” to include digging for worms, State v. Lemar, 87 A.2d 886 (1952), 
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found that bars simply “walking” within the intertidal zone.  No Maine 
case can be found (prior to Bell II) embracing the dubious distinctions 
and reasoning of Butler v. Attorney General.222   In Butler, the right to 
“swim” or “float” in public intertidal waters is said to be a permitted 
public use, but “bathing” is not a public use.223  One is at a loss to see the 
logic of this distinction, or how it would be enforced by an upland owner 
(or court) intent on limiting the jus publicum to fishing, fowling, and 
navigation. 
There are also historical records/studies in Maine that evidence the 
felt need to maintain both narrow upland areas, and almost all intertidal 
areas, both for lateral passage and the storage of people, boats, wagons, 
and animals.224  In the first serious settling of the Town of Cumberland 
(in the 1730s), for example, a three rod wide (49.5 feet) swath of upland 
was to be kept open for public use, and almost all of the initial property 
conveyances in the town bounded by the sea were specifically extended 
only to mean high.225  The intertidal land was to be kept open for lateral 
passage—this was at the time an essential public use right.226 
From statehood (1820) until Bell II (1989), no Maine case can be 
found that successfully challenged “walking,” “swimming,” “floating,” 
“bathing,” and “lateral passage”—activities well beyond the fishing, 
                                                                                                  
clams, State v. Leavitt, 72 A. 875 (1909), and shellfish, Moulton v. Libbey, 37 Me. 
472 (1854).   
Bell II, 557 A.2d at 173.  Unlike Bell II, none of these cases undertakes to limit public use 
rights.  On the contrary, they each incrementally broaden public use rights.  
The Bell II court was not inclined to overrule this long line of cases.  Instead, it 
disingenuously expresses a sympathy for this liberality—a sympathy not borne out by its 
holding, and certainly not borne out by plaintiffs in the two cases now before the Law 
Court.  More importantly, however, the long line of Maine cases the Bell II court would 
adroitly side-step give credence to the argument that the limitations on the jus publicum 
that Bell II imposed are not embodied in either the Colonial Ordinance itself, or prior 
Maine case law.  They have instead been fashioned out of whole cloth by the Bell II court 
and thus can and should be overturned by the Law Court.  
 222. 80 N.E. 688 (Mass. 1907). 
 223. Id. at 689. 
 224. See ORLANDO DELOGU, AN EXAMINATION AND UPDATING OF RESEARCH RELATIVE 
TO TOWN OF CUMBERLAND CLAIMS TO UPLAND ALONG THE FORESHORE AND TO 
INTERTIDAL LANDS (1991).  This source is on file in the University of Maine School of 
Law Library, and Cleaves Law Library. 
 225. Id.  Interesting, too, is the fact that some eighty years after passage of the 
Ordinance, no one in the Massachusetts legislative body authorizing the Proprietors of 
the Town of Cumberland to make initial conveyances of what presumably was public 
domain land, felt bound by the Ordinance to convey these (approximately one hundred) 
littoral parcels to mean low water.  
 226. See Delogu, supra note 224, at 13-18. 
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fowling, and navigation limitations said to exist.  This fact must be seen 
as evidence that no one, not upland owners or the public at large, 
believed that these activities were barred.  Stated more affirmatively, 
upland owners and the public at large believed that the jus publicum 
encompassed these activities and more as needs may dictate.227  
Depending on one’s view, the Ordinance may have conveyed to littoral 
landowners a “title” to intertidal land, a “qualified title” to intertidal land, 
or a mere “license” to use, fill, and thereby gain title to intertidal land.  
But there is full agreement that the Ordinance did not convey to littoral 
landowners a “fee simple absolute title” to intertidal land.  The broad 
range of reserved public use rights always remained in the hands of the 
state in trust for the people.228 
In sum, the Bell II court failed to consider relevant and conventional 
property law rules of construction, and it ignored case holdings urging 
application of these rules.  These were errors that led to further errors by 
the Bell II court, i.e., a failure to appreciate that the Ordinance grant of 
intertidal land to upland owners left a broad range of public uses, the jus 
publicum in governmental hands in trust for the public.  There can be 
little doubt that whatever property the upland owners received under the 
                                            
 227. Interestingly, New Hampshire law is strikingly similar to the reasoning laid out 
above.  As the New Hampshire Supreme Court explained in 1890:   
[T]he legal title of New Hampshire land was in the king, who held it as trustee in 
his official and representative capacity . . . . The seashore, arms of the sea, and 
large ponds, by reason of their special adaptation to public uses, were set apart and 
reserved as public waters . . . . “The use of navigable waters is inalienable . . . . ”  
Land covered by public water is capable of many uses. Rights of navigation and 
fishery are not in the whole estate. . . .  He [the king] “held the seashores as well as 
the land under the sea,” and other property of the same public class, “for the use 
and benefit of all the subjects, for all useful purposes, the principal of which were 
navigation and the fisheries.”  
Concord Mfg. v. Robertson, 25 A. 718, 721 (N.H. 1890) (emphasis added).  
 228. See James v. Inhabitants of Town of West Bath, 437 A.2d 863 (Me. 1981).   
Holding that state regulation of worm digging preempted local regulations, the court 
further noted:  
A consistent theme in the decisional law is the concept that Maine’s tidal lands and 
resources, including marine worms, are held by the State in a public trust for the 
people of the State.  The state, unless it has parted with title, owns the bed of all 
tidal waters within its jurisdiction as well as such waters themselves so far as they 
are capable of ownership, and has full power to regulate and control fishing therein 
for the benefit of all the people. 
Id. at 865-6 (quoting State v. Lemar, 87 A.2d 886, 887 (Me. 1952)).  At another point, the 
court states: “The continued vitality of the public trust doctrine was recently reaffirmed in 
Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597 (Me. 1981).”  James, 437 A.2d at n.5. 
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Ordinance, they took it with full knowledge that a robust jus publicum 
remained in place.   
Bell II’s major error, however, was its summary conclusion that 
Massachusetts’, and thus Maine’s post-Ordinance intertidal land law not 
only gave fee title to upland owners subject to a reserved “public 
easement,” but that this easement was “delimit[ed]”229—it encompassed 
“only fishing, fowling, and navigation.”230  By affixing these words of 
limitation—“delimit” and “only”—to the Ordinance (words that are not 
in the Ordinance, not implied, and that were not intended by the drafters 
of the Ordinance), the Bell II court has again erred.  These errors have 
expanded the rights of upland owners, and concomitantly narrowed 
public use rights and stultified the jus publicum.  Prior to Bell II, no 
Maine court had similarly held.    
The Bell II court’s unduly narrow delineation of the “scope” of 
reserved public rights and uses of intertidal land is both unwarranted and 
legally unsustainable; it runs counter to the very cases and authorities the 
court purports to rely upon.  It is a conclusion that almost certainly would 
not have been reached had the cited treatise and case law injunctions 
been followed, and/or if the court had fully grasped the purpose and 
meaning of the concept and doctrine of jus publicum.    
The latter concept has never been a static one.  Public uses of critical, 
unique intertidal lands have continuously changed over time; they must 
continue to do so.  Bell II has the effect of freezing the public use rights 
at a point in time nearly 350 years ago.  The dominant public uses then, 
become the “only” public uses permitted now.  Changed conditions, 
changed needs, new technologies, and whole new realities for public use 
of intertidal land can no longer be taken into account by an evolving 
body of law.  
This litany of error should be recognized by the Law Court and 
appropriate modifications of the Bell II holding fashioned—
modifications that both recognize a broadened range of reserved public 
use rights in Maine and/or that fully recognize the legislative enactment 
struck down by the Bell II holding.231  In short, Bell II’s “piece of judicial 
legislation” is egregious error which the amicus briefs call upon the Law 
Court to reverse.232  In doing so, the jus publicum will be reaffirmed, and 
                                            
 229. Bell II, 557 A.2d 168, 173 (Me. 1886) (emphasis added). 
 230. Id. at 173 (emphasis added). 
 231. Intertidal Land Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 571-573 (2005).   
 232. In Concord Manufacturing, the New Hampshire Supreme Court recognizes in a 
related context that alienation of trust property is a legislative function:  
[T]he title of the soil under large ponds and tide waters [held to be trust property] 
does not pass by an ordinary governmental grant of land bounded by or on them. 
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a range of public uses commensurate with today’s needs, and able to 
adjust to tomorrow’s changing conditions, can emerge. 
XI.  ARGUMENT: ISSUE VIII 
If the Law Court reexamines Bell II, we reach Issue VIII: 
 
Whether the Bell II court erred in concluding that The Intertidal Land 
Act233 constituted a taking of the upland owners’ private property, 
including whether the recent U.S. Supreme Court case, Stop the Beach 
Renourishment234 should alter the Bell II court’s analysis. 
 
The amicus briefs argued that the Bell II court had erred in 
concluding that the Act constituted a taking and that this error is 
underscored by the recently decided Stop the Beach Renourishment case. 
It must also be recognized that if any one of the substantive arguments 
previously advanced235 are acceded to by the Law Court, the whole 
paradigm is shifted.  The Intertidal Land Act will not have effected a 
taking of any upland owner property because the Law Court will have 
recognized either that the boundary of upland owner property236 does not 
reach below mean high237 or that, even if title to intertidal land remains 
with the upland owner, the residuum of the jus publicum remains with 
the state, in trust for the people.238  In either case, the Intertidal Land Act 
will not have invaded any private property right or interest of upland 
                                                                                                  
. . . [a]n alienation of the title of soil is not an exercise of executive [or judicial] 
power, and cannot be effected without legislative authority. 
Concord Mfg. v. Robertson, 25 A. 718, 720 (N.H. 1890). 
 233. tit. 12 §§ 571-573 (2005) (permitting the public to use intertidal lands for 
recreational purposes). 
 234. 560 U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2592 (2010). 
 235. Issues II, III, IV, IV, IV, or VII. 
 236. To be completely accurate, it should be noted that there is an exception for the 
relatively few parcels where adjacent intertidal land, now filled, was validly alienated 
pursuant to the Submerged Lands Act.    
 237. If the Law Court reaches this conclusion, it will have explicitly or implicitly found 
that the state holds title to intertidal land in trust for the people—the prevailing view in 
the United States will be reestablished as the law in Maine.      
 238. Even if, in addressing Issue VII, the Law Court does little more than expand the 
“scope” of the reserved “public easement” (beyond the narrow fishing, fowling, and 
navigation), the point being made here remains accurate.  The Intertidal Land Act would 
appropriately be seen as prior legislative action paralleling the court’s action (no taking).  
The Intertidal Land Act’s inclusion of police power regulatory measures designed to 
protect intertidal lands, and public use thereof, is quite clearly not a taking of any upland 
owner property interest.  
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owners.  It simply stands as a permissible legislative Act defining the jus 
publicum; a current range of permitted public uses of intertidal land are 
spelled out and some regulatory measures designed to protect intertidal 
land are fashioned.  The enactment applies only to property interests held 
by the state, in trust for the public.   
Even if all of the substantive arguments previously advanced by the 
amicus briefs are rejected by Law Court, leaving upland owners with fee 
title to intertidal lands, the Intertidal Land Act is still not an 
unconstitutional taking of upland owner property, as takings law is 
currently defined by national and Maine cases.239   If one asks: does the 
Intertidal Land Act take some property interest, however small, of upland 
landowners?  The answer is: yes.  The upland owner’s right to preclude 
many recreational uses240 in the intertidal zone would no longer be 
permitted.  But this is not the relevant question; the answer tells you 
nothing as to whether an unconstitutional taking has occurred.  Every 
zoning-type regulation in the country, permitting some uses in a 
particular zone and prohibiting others, takes away some element of 
private property prerogative.  But zoning regulations have long been 
deemed, necessary, and constitutionally permissible—not a taking.  The 
leading U.S. Supreme Court case dealing with regulatory takings, 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,241  noted that: “[g]overnment hardly 
could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be 
diminished without paying for every such change in the general law.”242 
In other words, not all regulations which diminish property rights are 
constitutionally impermissible—some are simply reasonable exercises by 
government of the police power necessary to protect some aspect of the 
public’s health, safety, or general welfare.  In determining whether a 
particular regulation is a reasonable, uncompensated diminution of a 
private property right, or an unconstitutional taking of that right, 
Pennsylvania Coal was also helpful.  The Court noted:  “the general rule, 
at least, is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if 
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”243  So the real 
question that must be asked and answered here is: does the Intertidal 
Land Act go “too far”? 
                                            
 239. See Orlando Delogu, The Law of Taking Elsewhere and One Suspect in Maine, 52 
ME. L. REV. 323, 325-33, 353-54 (2000). 
 240. Intertidal Land Act does not affect all recreational uses.  Both the state and upland 
owners agree that, pursuant to the reserved “public easement,” recreational fishing, 
boating, and bird shooting are already permitted public uses in intertidal land.    
 241. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
 242. Id. at 413.  
 243. Id. at 415.  
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It does not.  By any of the conventional factors courts use to 
determine whether a regulatory statute is reasonable, or a taking, the 
Intertidal Land Act passes the reasonable test.  The first thing courts 
often ask is whether the intrusion on the private property right serves a 
valid public interest.  The Intertidal Land Act restricts imprudent 
intertidal land uses, and it makes clear that municipalities may participate 
in regulating intertidal land use—provisions that benefit upland owners 
and the public alike.244 
The Intertidal Land Act’s authorization of recreational use within the 
intertidal zone by members of the public is nothing more than the 
recognition of a changed condition, a new reality that was unforeseen 
and unforeseeable at the time the reserved “public easement” was 
fashioned.  The new reality put simply is that the recreational use of 
intertidal land is as economically valuable in the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries as “wharfing out” (i.e. marine commerce and fishing) was 
in the colonial era.  This recognition is obvious to the public, and to 
courts and legislatures in other coastal states.245  This recognition 
breathes life into the common law, and is correctly seen as an exercise by 
the Maine legislature of its long-standing prerogative to define, modify, 
expand, and/or abrogate the common law.  It seems well within the 
legislative powers clause of the Maine Constitution.  
Another factor examined by courts in determining whether a 
regulation is reasonable, or a taking, is the economic consequences of the 
regulation.  Is the diminution in value caused by the regulation shocking 
or inconsequential?  Maine cases, and the case law of most jurisdictions, 
suggests that fairly large diminutions in value occasioned by the 
imposition of a regulation will be sustained—not a taking—if the 
economic value that remains with the regulation in place still provides a 
                                            
 244. Intertidal Land Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 571-573 (2005). 
 245. For example, in Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court noted:   
We have no difficulty in finding that, in this latter half of the twentieth century, the 
public rights in tidal lands are not limited to the ancient prerogatives of navigation 
and fishing, but extend as well to recreational uses, including bathing, swimming 
and other shore activities. The public trust doctrine, like all common law 
principles, should not be considered fixed or static, but should be molded and 
extended to meet changing conditions and needs of the public it was created to 
benefit. The legislature appears to have had such an extension in mind in enacting 
N.J.S.A. 12:3-33, 34, previously mentioned. 
Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 1972); 
see also Mathews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 363 (N.J. 1984) 
(“extension of the public trust doctrine to include bathing, swimming, and other shore 
activities is consonant with and furthers the general welfare”).  
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reasonable economic return to the property owner.246  Whichever way 
one approaches the economic consequences of the Intertidal Land Act, it 
seems fair to say that it has had little, or no, economic impact on the 
value of upland property.  These properties were not depressed in value 
before the Bell holdings, when a broad range of recreational uses of 
intertidal land was common, and they have not shot up in value since 
Bell II declared the Intertidal Land Act to be a taking.  In other words, 
the economic consequences of the Intertidal Land Act are negligible.  
This would suggest that the regulation is not a taking. 
A third factor often looked to in determining whether a regulation is 
permissible or a taking, is the reasonable expectations of property 
owners, particularly “investment-backed expectations.” This formulation 
for examining the taking question derives from another widely cited U.S. 
Supreme Court case, Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New 
York.247  What then were the “reasonable investment-backed 
expectations” of the Bell plaintiffs?  Arguably, there were not any in this 
case because there was no investment.  Bell’s predecessors in title were 
the beneficiaries of a windfall, a gift bestowed on them by the Ordinance.  
Can one reasonably expect such fortuity?  Not usually.  The loss of a 
windfall can hardly be characterized as a taking.  
Given these beginnings, was it reasonable for the grantee to expect 
that some reciprocal duty would never be imposed?  Hardly.  Was it 
reasonable for the grantee to expect that the reservation would be 
interpreted narrowly against the interests of the grantor, in this case, the 
public?  Hardly.  Was it reasonable for the grantee to expect that the 
reserved rights would be frozen in time—that they would never be 
adjusted to take into account changed conditions, new and unforeseen 
public uses of intertidal land?  Hardly.  Expectations like these are not 
reasonable.   
If the questions are put the other way one might ask: is it reasonable 
for the Bell plaintiffs, beneficiaries of a gift, to seek the narrowest 
interpretation of the reserved public easement?  It is not.  Is it reasonable 
for the Bell plaintiffs, and the Bell II court, to claim that the Intertidal 
Land Act is a taking because it deprives upland owners of  “the general 
right to exclude others”?  It is not.  There never was a general right to 
exclude others.  It’s a fiction demonstrating the unreasonableness of the 
Bell plaintiffs and the illogic of the Bell II holding. 
                                            
 246. See Hall v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot. 528 A.2d 453 (Me. 1987). 
 247. 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (holding that none of the reasonable investment-backed 
expectations of Penn Central were cut off by the regulation—there was no taking).    
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Passage of the Ordinance may have given upland owners a title to 
intertidal land, but, at the very least, a reserved “public easement” was 
simultaneously created.  Stated more generously, the residuum of public 
use rights, the jus publicum, continued. These interests, however 
characterized, are held in trust by government, and serve to retain long-
standing public access to, and public use of, intertidal land.  Whether by 
Ordinance or jus publicum or both, access and use rights were intended 
to benefit the public the whole public.248  Whether one looks to the 
Ordinance or to the jus publicum, no member of the public was, or could 
be, excluded by upland owners; not historically, not now.  In short, the 
public has always had access to intertidal land.  The Intertidal Land Act 
merely broadens and makes explicit the uses available to today’s public 
pursuant to this right of access.  And, as shown above, it does so in a 
manner that does not rise to the level of a taking.249    
Finally, Alger,250 the case most often relied upon by the Bell courts, 
anticipated the very issues raised here.  Chief Justice Shaw, while 
confirming the title of upland owners arising out of the Ordinance, 
stated: 
[T]he riparian proprietor[s] . . . must have well understood that 
all estate[s] granted by the government to individuals is subject, 
by reasonable implication, to such restraints in its use, as shall 
make the enjoyment of it by the grantee consistent with the equal 
                                            
 248. The Bell II court’s flawed reasoning on this point draws heavily on the flawed 
reasoning and takings analysis of a Massachusetts advisory opinion.  Opinion of the 
Justices (Mass. Opinion), 313 N.E.2d 561, 567-569 (Mass. 1974).  The Mass. Opinion is 
premised on the view that the Ordinance gave upland owners fee title which drew with it 
a general right to exclude.   Such a view is inconsistent with both the reserved public 
easement and the jus publicum, which could not be alienated, and which guaranteed a 
general public right of access to intertidal land.  Long-standing rights of lateral passage, 
sitting, storing nets, grazing animals, et cetera, bear out the fact that this general right of 
access extended beyond the access for fishing, fowling, and navigation specifically noted 
in the Ordinance.  The errors of the Massachusetts court were followed almost word for 
word by the Bell II court (see Bell II, 557 A.2d at 177-178) and led to Bell II’s erroneous 
holding that the Intertidal Land Act was a taking.  These compounded errors should not 
be perpetuated. 
 249. Bell II’s reliance on cases such as Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. is misplaced. In these cases, prior to 
regulation, there was no preexisting right to use or access the property—here, there 
clearly is.  Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
 250. Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53 (1851). 
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enjoyment by others [the public] of their several and common 
rights . . . .251 
Chief Justice Shaw continued: 
Considering, therefore, that all real estate derived from the 
government is subject to some restraint for the general good, 
whether such restraint be regarded as a police regulation [or] of 
any other character; considering that sea-shore estate, though 
held in fee by the riparian proprietor, both on account of the 
qualified reservation under which the grant was made, and the 
peculiar nature and character, position and relations of the estate, 
and the great public interests associated with it, is more 
especially subject to some reasonable restraints, in order that 
the exercise of full dominion over it, by the proprietor, may not 
be noxious to others, and injurious to the public, the court are of 
opinion that the legislature has power, by a general law affecting 
all riparian proprietors on the same line of shore equally and 
alike, to make reasonable regulations, declaring the public right, 
and providing for its preservation by reasonable restraints, and to 
enforce these restraints by suitable penalties.252   
All of Chief Justice Shaw’s foregoing arguments suggest that the 
Bell II court’s conclusion that the Intertidal Land Act was a taking of 
property are incorrectly premised and incorrectly apply current takings 
law.  The Intertidal Land Act is a legislative exercise of the Maine’s 
power to clarify or redefine the common law (the jus publicum, the 
reserved public right), to adjust to new realities, new valuable uses of 
intertidal land.  At the same time, the Intertidal Land Act is an exercise 
of police power, a regulatory measure that confers benefits on both 
upland owners and the public.  It does not go “too far.”  The Intertidal 
Land Act is therefore entitled to deference by the Law Court; it follows 
then that the Law Court should reverse the holding of Bell II, and to 
declare the Intertidal Land Act valid and fully operational. 
The above arguments were buttressed by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
holding in Stop the Beach Renourishment,253 handed down even while 
                                            
 251. Id. at 94.  A complete reading of this portion of the opinion seems useful. 
 252. Id. at 95 (emphasis added).    
 253. 560 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010).  In accordance with Law Court briefing 
schedules, the McGarvey amicus brief was submitted to the court on June 2, 2010; it 
contains no reference to Stop the Beach Renourishment.  The Flaherty amicus brief 
submitted to the Law Court on June 30, 2010 contains argument (Issue VIII in that brief) 
that relies on the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning in Stop the Beach Renourishment that 
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briefs in the Flaherty and McGarvey cases were being submitted.  On the 
critical (for our purposes) taking issue in Stop the Beach Renourishment, 
the U.S. Supreme Court (by a vote of 8-0)254 affirmed Florida’s highest 
court and sustained what seems an axiomatic proposition: that in order 
for a “taking” argument to succeed, the party who claims its property 
interest has been taken, must show that it actually possesses the property 
interest in question.255  The littoral upland owners in the Florida case, and 
in Bell II, failed to meet this threshold requirement; thus their “taking” 
claim fails.  Justice Scalia, speaking for the Court, noted: 
There is no taking unless petitioner can show that, before the 
Florida Supreme Court’s decision [sustaining the State’s claim to 
the renourished beach], littoral property owners had rights to 
future accretions and contact with the water superior to the 
State’s right to fill in its submerged land.  Though some may 
think the question close, in our view the showing cannot be 
made.256 
The Court went on to note that the Takings Clause only protects 
property rights as they are established under state law, not as they might 
have been established or ought to have been established.257  We cannot 
say that the Florida Supreme Court’s decision eliminated a right of 
accretion established under Florida law.258  In short, no property interest 
means no valid “taking” claim.   
A second aspect of the case worth noting is that the Court in Stop the 
Beach Renourishment puts the threshold burden of showing that a 
property interest exists squarely on the petitioner, the party claiming 
there is a “taking.”259  The mere assertion of a “taking” claim does not 
shift the threshold burden onto the state to show that its actions do not 
constitute a “taking.”   The relevance of these aspects of the Stop the 
Beach Renourishment holding to issues currently before the Law Court 
seems clear.   Bell II held that the Intertidal Land Act constituted a 
“taking” of littoral upland owners’ property.  But Stop the Beach 
Renourishment prompts one to ask—what property interest of littoral 
                                                                                                  
seemingly precludes Bell II’s finding that Maine’s Intertidal Land Act constituted a 
taking of upland owner property interests.  
 254. Justice Stevens did not participate in the decision.    
 255. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 560 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. at 2611. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. at 2612. 
 258. Id. 
 259. See id. at 2611.  Justice Scalia makes clear that the littoral property owners theory, 
“puts the burden on the wrong party.”  Id. 
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upland owners is invaded by the Intertidal Land Act?  Did the Bell 
plaintiffs meet their burden of showing that a protectable property 
interest exists?  The short answer to these questions is: none and no.   
The Intertidal Land Act does not challenge any aspect of littoral 
upland owners’ purported title to intertidal land; nor does it encourage or 
permit any invasion, by any member of the public of the upland portion 
(the area above the mean high tideline) of the littoral landowners’ 
property.260   If the Intertidal Land Act did either of these two things, a 
“taking” claim might very well lie.  The question, then, remains—what 
property right of littoral upland owners involving intertidal land is 
invaded by the Intertidal Land Act?   
As noted earlier, the Bell II court accepted in total the Massachusetts 
court’s reasoning that the Ordinance conveyed a title to littoral upland 
owners of intertidal lands; the court also held that this title drew with it a 
“right to exclude the public.”261  But even if one concedes, for the sake of 
argument, that littoral upland owners have some form of title to intertidal 
land, what they do not have is a “fee simple absolute” title.262  All parties 
concede that the Ordinance, the granting instrument, simultaneously gave 
rise to a public easement specifically allowing within the intertidal zone 
public access (at a minimum) for fishing, fowling, and navigation.  This 
precludes characterization of the upland owner’s title to this land as 
“absolute”; they do not have all of the sticks in the property rights 
bundle.  Because the whole public may exercise the public easement then 
no one can be excluded by upland owners from the intertidal zone.   
Further limiting upland owners’ claimed right to exclude the public 
from intertidal land is the previously noted fact that the Ordinance 
contains no language that limits the reserved public easement to access 
for fishing, fowling, and navigation only. 263   No such limiting language 
can be found anywhere in the Ordinance.  A non-trespassory access to 
engage in other public uses of intertidal land, such as sitting, walking, 
lateral passage, or the temporary grazing of animals, has a long history 
that both pre-dates and post-dates the Ordinance.  There is no evidence 
supporting the assertion that upland owners’ (who have less than “fee 
                                            
 260. In Stop the Beach Renourishment, the Court, littoral landowners, and the state all 
agreed that if the renourishment project had extended above the mean high tide line, the 
state would have had to acquire the upland property it needed, or a “taking” claim would 
certainly lie. See id. at 2600 n.2.   
 261. Bell II, 557 A.2d 168, 178 (Me. 1989). 
 262. This point is important because only an “absolute” title, a title that includes all of 
the sticks in the property rights bundle, would allow the holders of such title the right to  
exclude whom they will from the property.      
 263. See supra arguments under Issue VII. 
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simple absolute” title to intertidal land) could exclude members of the 
public who would engage in these activities in the intertidal zone.  No 
Maine cases have been found that bar the public from engaging in these 
activities. 
And finally on this point, historically broad public access and use 
rights were part of the jus publicum, which as previously noted were not 
abridged or abrogated by any express language in the Ordinance.  These 
jus publicum rights,264 which were held in trust, by the original colonial 
government, and which are now held by a successor government, the 
State of Maine, dictate that upland owners (who, at most, hold a title to 
intertidal land that is not “absolute”) have no right to exclude the public 
who would engage in these jus publicum access and use rights in the 
intertidal zone.265    
In sum, the Bell II court’s reasoning that the Intertidal Land Act is a 
taking because the Intertidal Land Act infringed upon the upland owner’s 
right to exclude the public from these lands, is not borne out by the facts.  
Upland owners do not have “fee simple absolute” title to intertidal 
land—thus they have no right to exclude anyone from the intertidal zone.  
The public (every member of the public), either through the reserved 
public easement created by the Ordinance itself, or by the grantors 
retention of the residuum of rights not expressly granted by the 
Ordinance, or by application of the far more ancient jus publicum 
                                            
 264. Jus publicum access rights certainly include fishing, fowling, and navigation 
(broadly defined).  Historically, they included sitting, walking, lateral passage, the 
temporary grazing of animals, and today they would almost certainly include general 
beach-related recreation activities: bathing, surfing, kite-flying, and scuba diving—not to 
mention structures that house or support water-related recreational pursuits.  This list is 
not intended to be exclusive, and it will, as history shows us, evolve over time.    
 265. Bell I and Bell II do not hold that the jus publicum has been abrogated.  To do so 
would have required them to ignore or overrule any number of Massachusetts and Maine 
cases which, long after the Ordinance came into being, allude to the continuing existence 
of the jus publicum. See, e.g. Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53, 90 (1851); Boston 
Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Mass., 393 N.E.2d 356, 359 (1979); and in Maine, Moulton v. 
Libbey, 37 Me. 472, 485-486 (1854); Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597, 605 (Me. 
1981).  The Bell cases suggest, without any analysis or case law support, that jus 
publicum rights of access and use have been conflated with and are limited, defined by, 
the public easement reserved in the Ordinance.  They go so far as to suggest that littoral 
upland owners in Maine are now trustees of whatever public access and use rights exist. 
See Bell II, 557 A.2d 168, 171 (Me. 1886).  But the Ordinance itself does not say, or even 
suggest this; this view, as noted, is contrary to conventional property law rules for 
gratuitous conveyances. See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 8.24, 8.25, 8.67 (1952).  
Finally, no Maine case has been found that has taken a view similar to that of the Bell II 
holding.  The Bell II court’s reasoning is an error built on an error, and ought not to be 
perpetuated by the Law Court.  See supra note 248 (citing to Mass. Opinion). 
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doctrine, has both access to intertidal land and a wide range of historic 
and modern use rights.   
The conclusion is clear: the Intertidal Land Act does not effect a 
taking, because it has not infringed on any property right held by littoral 
upland owners.266  Equally clear is the fact that the holding in Stop the 
Beach Renourishment requires that before a taking claim can be brought 
one must possess a unique property right and demonstrate that this right 
has been infringed by some governmental action.  The littoral upland 
owners in Bell II have not met these requirement, thus there is no taking. 
An attenuated argument that upland owners have a property in 
dictating the uses that the public may undertake while in the intertidal 
zone also fails.  Suffice it to say there is nothing in the Ordinance that 
suggests that these grantees were also given a right or property-type 
interest to pick, choose, identify, or shape in any way, the public uses 
permitted or barred in the reserved public easement.  This bears 
repeating—there is no language, not even a hint, in the Ordinance that 
the power to dictate or limit future uses of intertidal land was conferred.  
To be sure, fishing, fowling, and navigation are specifically 
mentioned in the Ordinance as permitted public uses.  However, as 
previously noted, these were examples of the most common, the most 
obvious public uses of the day.  But there is no suggestion in the critical 
four lines of the Ordinance that the drafters of the Ordinance intended to 
exclude any or all other public uses; or, that they clothed these grantees 
and their successors with a power to limit or bar future uses of public 
intertidal lands that an elected legislative body would deem necessary 
and appropriate to define or explicate the jus publicum, enabling it to 
meet the needs of that day.   
An analogy to modern zoning law is apt.  Can property owners 
subject to a validly enacted zoning law dictate permitted uses in a given 
zone? Can they dictate uses that will be barred in the future?  Can they 
preclude the governing body from changing permitted and prohibited 
uses as changed conditions over time may dictate?  Obviously not.  A 
landowner has no property interest in an existing framework of zoning 
law.  Similarly, littoral upland owners have no property interest allowing 
them to dictate or limit public uses in the intertidal zone.  
An even more attenuated argument might suggest that the Bell II 
court has recognized or conferred on upland owners a property-type 
interest that the Ordinance did not convey.  Can the Bell II court in the 
                                            
 266. The littoral owners’ claim some type of qualified title to these lands is not 
infringed; the upland portion of their littoral estate is not infringed; and they had no right 
to exclude anyone from intertidal land to begin with.   
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same breath claim to be the source of the property right and assert that 
the legislature’s passage of the Intertidal Land Act has infringed this 
right, thus giving rise to a taking claim?  This proposition seems 
untenable.  As previous arguments have noted, it is not supported by 
separation of powers principles, or the holding in Stop the Beach 
Renourishment. 
One might begin by noting that courts almost never create property 
rights.  The regulatory process, exercises of police power, contract law, 
and acts of legislatures267 are the sources of property rights.  In Stop the 
Beach Renourishment, Florida statutes268 shaped the law that delineated 
the line between accretion and avulsion; that law, in turn gave rise to the 
holding that the beach renourishment in question did not infringe any 
property interest of littoral upland owners, and thus, that no “taking” 
claim existed.   
In the same vein, Maine’s Intertidal Land Act delineated permitted 
public uses in the intertidal zone more precisely than they had been.  
Clearly, the Colonial Ordinance did not express an intention to exclude 
public uses other than those noted; nor does it clothe the grantees or their 
successors with a power to limit or bar other public uses of intertidal land 
in the future.  But that’s precisely what upland owners were seeking to 
do; that’s the mindset that eventually gave rise to the Bell cases.  In this 
context, it was both necessary and appropriate for the Maine Legislature 
to enact the Intertidal Land Act. 
Prior to Bell II the Legislature’s right/duty to reshape the common 
law, the jus publicum, to more fully meet public needs, had seldom been 
questioned, much less found to be an unconstitutional “taking.”  The Bell 
II court erred in doing so here; its errors trace back to its misreading of 
what the Colonial Ordinance did, and did not do.  The court also erred in 
its application of conventional takings law to the facts and statute before 
it, and in the lack of deference shown to legislative enactments, i.e., the 
Intertidal Land Act. 
This brings us to Stop the Beach Renourishment, a case decided 
subsequent to Bell II, but a case that the Law Court can and should take 
into account in reviewing Bell II’s takings analysis.  The key holdings in 
Stop the Beach Renourishment are that a property interest must be shown 
                                            
 267. See Bd. of Regents of State Colls v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).  The Court noted 
that: “protected interests in property are normally not created by the Constitution. Rather, 
they are created and their dimensions are defined by an independent source such as state 
statutes or rules.”  Id. at 577; see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).  
 268. See Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560 U.S. __, 130 
S. Ct. 2592, 2600 (2010). 
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to exist before a “taking” claim will lie, and that the burden is on the 
petitioners (here, littoral upland property owners) to show that a property 
right (here a right to dictate future public uses in the intertidal zone) 
actually exists.269 Amicus Brief #2 argued that littoral upland owners (the 
Bell plaintiffs) did not meet these threshold requirements.  It seems clear 
that no property interest of these littoral owners was invaded; that they 
do not possess either a right to exclude members of the public from the 
intertidal zone, or a right to dictate or limit future public uses in the 
intertidal zone.  Ergo, Stop the Beach Renourishment bars a takings 
claim.   
It follows then that the Bell II court’s conclusion that the Intertidal 
Land Act constitutes a “taking” should not be allowed to stand.  The Law 
Court, in the cases now before it, was urged to reverse Bell II.  It seems 
clear that the Intertidal Land Act is both constitutional and necessary 
legislation that breathes life into the jus publicum. 
XII.  ARGUMENT: ISSUE IX 
If the Law Court declines to re-examine both Bell I and Bell II in 
deciding the two cases before it, we reach Issue IX:   
 
Whether the Maine Superior Court in McGarvey v. Whittredge 
correctly held that the term “navigation” allows the public to use 
intertidal land to gain access to deeper water for the purpose of engaging 
in recreational or commercial scuba diving.   
 
The amicus briefs argued that the superior court’s holding on this 
point is correct and should be affirmed.  The superior court, bound by the 
Bell cases, framed the issues correctly.  Bell II held that the reserved 
“public easement” was limited to “fishing, fowling, and navigation.”  
Defendants, as members of the public, must show that their activities fall 
within the parameters of one of these three terms of art.  If they can, the 
activity is permitted; if they cannot, the activity is barred.          
The superior court had little difficulty determining that defendants 
use of plaintiffs’ intertidal land to picnic and socialize with clients before 
and after scuba diving activities did not fall within the parameters of any 
                                            
 269. Whether the property right arises from state regulatory measures, statutory 
enactments, or arises from language in the original Ordinance grant is a matter of 
indifference—but, it must be shown to independently exist; it cannot be fashioned out of 
whole cloth by the judicial branch of government.    
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of the permitted uses.270  The court characterized these actions as a 
“trespass” and awarded nominal damages.271  But merely walking across 
plaintiffs intertidal land to ingress or egress the water for the purpose of 
teaching or engaging in scuba diving was held by the court to be within 
the term “navigation,” and therefore a permitted public use.272    
The court’s decision seems to turn on a question it poses to itself, 
“whether the law [the definition of navigation] is captive of the practices 
that existed in 1647 or has it evolved?”273  The court immediately 
answers its question by drawing upon case law, noted in the Bell II 
dissenting opinion,274 which clearly indicates that the terms “fishing” and 
“navigation” have both evolved over time.275  Focusing on “navigation,” 
the court cites Marshall v. Walker276 and Andrews v. King,277 in 
particular.  The Marshall court, speaking of intertidal land, noted that:  
[T]he jus publicum remains. [The public] may sail over them 
[flats], may moor their craft upon them, may allow their vessels 
to rest upon the soil when bare, may land and walk upon them, 
may ride or skate over them when covered with water-bearing 
ice, may fish in the water over them, may dig shellfish in them, 
may take sea manure from them. . . .278 
The Andrews court adds: “[t]he right of navigation so reserved is not 
simply the right to sail over the flats, when covered with water . . . but 
includes the right of mooring on the flats, of unloading the cargo upon 
                                            
 270. McGarvey, WASHSC-CV-08-42 at 9. 
 271. Id.  Neither party to these proceedings contested this holding of the lower court.   
 272. Id. 
 273. See id. at 6. 
 274. See Bell II, 557 A.2d 168, 186-187 (Me. 1989).  The court could also have cited 
cases that the Bell II majority acknowledged had broadened the term navigation under the 
rubrics of “a sympathetically generous interpretation” of the term, and/or that were 
deemed “reasonably incidental or related thereto.” Id. at 173.  
 275. McGarvey, WASHSC-CV-08-42 at 7-8.  A broader range of authority supports 
this view.  See 2 MAINE LAW AFFECTING MARINE RESOURCES 235 (1970) (“[T]he modern 
interpretation of the right of navigation is much broader than the English common law 
right of navigation or the right of navigation expressed in the Colonial Ordinances. . . .”  
This treatise goes on to lay out Maine case law that gave rise to an expanded array of 
“fishing” and “navigation” related uses.  Id. at 236-41; see also Whittlesey, Law of the 
Seashore, Tide-waters and Great Ponds in Massachusetts and Maine (1932) (“In Maine, 
however, the courts have extended the public privileges on flats and navigable rivers to 
include . . . [cases fashioning an expanded array of fishing and navigation uses are then 
laid out].”).  Id. at 14. 
 276. 45 A. 497 (Me. 1900). 
 277. 129 A. 298 (Me. 1925). 
 278. Marshall, 45 A. at 498.  
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the flats, and of transporting it to other men’s lands and houses.”279  In 
sum, the Maine Superior Court’s view that the term “navigation” has 
evolved beyond its 1647 parameters seems born out in scholarly 
writings, and by an extensive array of Maine case law. 
Having made this essential point, the superior court acknowledges 
that, “scuba diving and its associated uses did not exist when the Law 
Court last dealt with interpretation of the term navigation . . . .”280  In 
other words, there is no higher court opinion directly on point.  The court 
resolves this dilemma by reasoning: 
[A] narrow reading of the term navigation, as encouraged by the 
plaintiff, seeks to ignore the evolution and expansion of that term 
by . . . the courts.  A narrow reading of navigation would trap the 
law to uses and related events associated with navigation as it 
existed in the 1900’s and earlier . . . it does significant damage to 
the evolution of the common law to reflect and react to the 
development of our society.281 
This reasoning led the court to conclude that scuba diving is a 
permitted use in the intertidal zone, a further evolving of the public’s 
navigational right.282  The amicus briefs, agreeing with the court’s logic 
and result, would also reference the case of Butler v. Attorney General.283  
This case states that: “among these [public rights] is, of course, the right 
of navigation, with such incidental rights as pertain thereto.  We think 
that there is a right to swim or float in or upon public waters as well as to 
sail upon them.”284  Butler clearly suggests that the public’s navigational 
                                            
 279. Andrews, 129 A. at 299.  
 280. McGarvey, WASHSC-CV-08-42 at 7.   
 281. Id. at 7-8. 
 282. Id. at 9. 
 283. 195 Mass. 79 (1907).     
 284. Id. at 84.  The Butler court distinguished swimming and floating (holding these to 
be  permitted public uses) from bathing (holding it not to be a public use) probably on the 
ground that the latter usually takes place in shallower intertidal water, or in the surf, and 
often involves laying or being upon an exposed portion of beach below mean high for 
extended periods of time.  Whether this distinction as a practical matter, or in law, was 
sound when Butler was decided, or is sound today, was not a matter the superior court 
needed to reach or discuss.  It did not comment on the Butler court’s distinction, but 
make no mistake, Butler sustains the superior court’s conclusion.    
On the point of whether the Butler distinction should be reexamined, it is 
appropriate simply to note that the Butler distinction is thin indeed.  It is certainly within 
the Law Court’s prerogative to reexamine it.  In doing so, the court ought to accept the 
view that the same evolving of permitted uses or a “sympathetic generosity of 
interpretation” of permitted uses that allowed the superior court, and hopefully the Law 
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use right includes scuba diving, which involves swimming, floating, 
moving about in intertidal waters.   It seems clear that scuba diving is 
correctly seen as a permitted, an “evolved,” and an “incidental public use 
right.”  
Finally, one must note that the Bell II holding, at least impliedly, 
supports the superior court’s holding.   Bell II states: 
We have held that the public may fish, fowl, or navigate on the 
privately owned land for pleasure as well as for business, or 
sustenance, Barrows v. McDermott, 73 Me at 449; and we have 
in other ways given a sympathetically generous interpretation to 
what is encompassed within the terms, “fishing,” “fowling,” and 
“navigation,” or reasonably incidental or related thereto.285  
Assuming the premise made at the outset of this argument that Bell II 
remains the controlling law with respect to public and private rights in 
the intertidal zone, it is irrelevant whether Bell II’s  interpretation of 
reserved public rights is more or less generous than some might like.  It 
is generous enough to affirm the superior court’s holding.  An 
affirmation by the Law Court of the lower court’s holding would be a 
small but useful step in the right direction. 
XIII.  CONCLUSION 
It is not possible, or particularly useful, to recapitulate arguments 
carefully laid out in the nine separate issues.  There are, however, several 
underlying themes that bear repeating.  To begin with, for nearly 2,000 
years organized society has viewed the intertidal zone as a unique 
space—a fragile area of transition between open ocean, not amenable to 
private ownership, and littoral upland, which is, for the most part, 
privately owned.  Most nations, and states within our nation, have 
retained a large degree of public ownership of, and a trusteeship with 
respect to public uses in, these intertidal areas.  Discrete parcels of 
intertidal land have been alienated, often to facilitate commerce; this is 
the exception, not the rule. 
Second, the range of uses made of these intertidal areas over this 
2,000 year period has varied widely and is constantly changing.  The 
drying of nets, erection of weirs, lateral passage along the foreshore are 
almost non-existent today; recreational activities too numerous to 
                                                                                                  
Court, to accept scuba diving as a logical extension of navigational use, would also 
accept bathing as a similar logical extension of a permitted use. 
 285. See Bell II, 557 A.2d 168, 173 (Me. 1989) (emphasis added).   
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mention, surfboards, scuba diving, lawyers offices and condominiums on 
refurbished piers—who could have imagined it when the Ordinance was 
promulgated to facilitate commerce in a fledgling colonial setting.  The 
beauty of the common law is its ability to adjust to changing conditions 
and new realities.  The jus publicum has a similar vitality with respect to 
defining and redefining public uses of intertidal land.  The Bell decisions 
lose this adaptability and the flexibility to adjust to the next round of 
change.  These decisions trap us in the past. 
This factor alone, beyond the arguments raised in the issues 
presented above, strongly suggests that the Bell cases were wrongly 
decided.  This view finds expression in the dissent in Bell II, the 
concurring opinion in Eaton, and in Maine Superior Court decisions that 
press Bell II to its limits, and often a small step beyond.  The superior 
court findings of fact in Muther barely temper the court’s incredulity 
with the Bell cases.  And finally, a growing range of scholarly writing 
has critically reviewed these cases.  None of this is likely to end unless 
the Law Court reexamines these cases and modifies them in a way that 
gives new vitality to the jus publicum—that enables the common law to 
adjust and accommodate to new and changing conditions.  
Finally, it must be noted that the Bell cases represent a paradigm 
shift, a break with the past that is not in the best interest of large numbers 
of Maine people.  Prior to the Bell holdings, generations of Maine 
people, including many littoral upland landowners, grew up honestly 
believing that the public had a right to be upon intertidal land to walk, 
swim, sit, fish, shoot duck, play with children and sand toys, toss a ball, 
skim and ride boards on the very edge of the surf, put in a boat, a kayak, 
a surfboard, or just watch the water, the waves, the changing colors of 
the sea and sky.  No one thought to interdict these pleasures; few thought 
it was possible to interdict them. 
The Bell cases ended that long bucolic era of sharing public and 
private use rights in the intertidal zone.  What has emerged is a growing 
private property rights zealotry, and counsel equal to the task, ready to 
press each case.  One of the parties in the cases now before the Law 
Court uses the phrase “appellant’s beach” repeatedly, as if he created it, 
or earned it, rather than being the fortuitous beneficiary of random 
events.   Littoral upland owners today talk openly of exclusion, keeping 
people out, limiting the range of permitted public uses in the intertidal 
zone.  The larger public has had to adjust to these new realities; there is a 
growing range of places they cannot go, and a growing range of 
pleasurable activities that cannot be permissibly engaged in.  One is 
constantly aware today that one may be asked to move along.  Like the 
shrinking of Maine’s northern forests, and the increased posting of lands 
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throughout the state, accessible foreshore is less and less open to the 
public; it is becoming an enclave of the wealthy. 
All of this derives from the Bell cases.  This paradigm shift is 
unwarranted; it’s bad for Maine’s people and our economy.  More 
importantly, Maine’s people and Legislature have never alienated the 
vast majority of our intertidal lands.  We never, with our own statehood 
in hand, examined the implications of the Ordinance.  We never grasped 
the full meaning of the equal-footing doctrine.   We simply acquiesced.  
The court in Lapish, told us it was no longer “an open question,” and we 
believed it. 286  The Bell cases repeat this theme.  They would confine us 
to a history Massachusetts created for us—a history we did not create for 
ourselves. Phillips Petroleum says it’s not too late; 171 years of error can 
be undone. 
In short, public and private sharing of Maine’s intertidal lands can, 
and must be revived.  We cannot be locked into an ambiguous 360-year 
old Ordinance, and be held captive by Massachusetts law.   Maine can 
and must develop its own intertidal land law.  Private property rights 
count, but the public interest of an entire state counts for more.  The Law 
Court should correct the errors of our past—to fashion a robust jus 
publicum—to recognize that the tidelands in truth, and in law, belong to 
the people of Maine. 
                                            
 286. Lapish v. Bangor Bank, 8 Me. 85, 93 (1831).  
